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INTRODUCTION

During the Survey year,' the Illinois Supreme Court resolved numerous challenges to the constitutionality of various Illinois statutes. The challenged statutes ranged from criminal law and
procedure to taxation. The court assessed the validity of these statutes in terms of equal protection, due process, and separation of
powers. In addition, the court resolved several constitutional challenges based upon the Bill of Rights and offered a definitive interpretation of selected provisions of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.
This article will highlight and discuss the most significant of these
recent decisions.
II.

A.

CASE LAW

Equal Protection

During the Survey year, the supreme court resolved several challenges to the constitutionality of selected statutes based upon the
equal protection clause. The equal protection clauses in the Illinois
* Hearings Officer, Illinois Department of Public Aid; B.A., 1977, Marquette University; J.D., 1980, Loyola University of Chicago.
** B.A., 1987, Boston College; J.D. candidate, 1990, Loyola University of Chicago.
1. The Survey period extends from July 1, 1987, through July 1, 1988.
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and federal constitutions insure individuals that the laws enacted
by the state will apply equally to all citizens similarly situated. 2 To
resolve the equal protection challenges presented, the supreme
court typically applied the rational relation test.3 The rational relation test requires that the statute bear a rational relation to a
valid legislative purpose.4 If the court identified a rational relation
between the statute and a valid legislative purpose, the court upheld the statute as constitutional. If a valid legislative purpose
could not be proven, the court invalidated the statute as violative
of equal protection. 5
In People v. Esposito,6 the supreme court held that the summary
suspension of a drunk driver's license, pursuant to section 11501.1
of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code, does not violate the equal protection clauses of the Illinois and federal constitutions.7 The defendant in Esposito was charged with driving under the influence of
alcohol after a breath test indicated a blood alcohol concentration
of .16.8 Pursuant to section 11-501.1, the Secretary of State then
summarily suspended the defendant's driver's license. 9
In response to the suspension, the defendant petitioned the court
for a rescission hearing' 0 and also moved to dismiss the indictment
on the grounds that section 11-501.1 violates the equal protection
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
3. The rational relation test is the second tier of the two-tiered scrutiny ordinarily
applied in cases involving equal protection challenges. The two-tiered scrutiny differentiates between those statutes affecting a fundamental right or a constitutionally suspect
class and those not affecting a fundamental right or a suspect class. The court traditionally has scrutinized more closely those statutes in the former category while only subjecting the latter statutes to a rational relation scrutiny. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 588-93 (1 1th ed. 1985).
None of the cases addressed by the supreme court during the Survey year affected a
fundamental right or involved a suspect class, and therefore they were scrutinized under
the rational relation test.
4. The supreme court has held, however, that the State need not prove the existence
of a valid legislative purpose, and in the absence of proof to the contrary, a valid purpose
will be presumed. People v. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d 64, 521 N.E.2d 1158 (1988).
5. The court did not invalidate any statutes on equal protection grounds during the
Survey year.
6. 121 I11.2d 491, 521 N.E.2d 873 (1988).
7. Id. at 504, 521 N.E.2d at 879. Section 11-501.1 authorizes the summary suspension of drunk drivers who refuse to take a breath test or other similar chemical test, or
who submit to a chemical test and have a blood alcohol concentration over .10. ILL.
REV. STAT.

ch. 95 1/2, para. 11-501.1 (1987).

8. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d at 496, 521 N.E.2d at 875.
9. Id.
10. Id. Section 2-118.1(b) of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code permits a person to
petition the court for a rescission hearing following a summary suspension of one's
driver's license. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 2-118.1(b) (1987).
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clause." The defendant argued that section 11-501.1 arbitrarily
treats drunk drivers on public highways and drunk drivers on private roadways unequally.' 2 The defendant also contended that the
statute arbitrarily penalizes drunk drivers with a blood alcohol
concentration over. 10, but not drunk drivers with a blood alcohol
concentration of less than .10.13
The circuit court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, ruling that section 11-501.1 violated the equal protection clause.14 On
appeal, the supreme court rejected the defendant's equal protection
challenge and upheld section 11-501.1 as constitutional. 5 Applying the two-step analysis used to assess whether a statute provides
an individual with equal protection under the law, 6 the court first
ruled that the right to drive a car is not a fundamental right and
that the group of "drunk drivers on public highways" is not a constitutionally suspect class."' The court, therefore, concluded that
the requirements of equal protection would be met if the statute
bore a rational relation to a valid legislative purpose. I8 Based upon
its review of the legislative intent of the summary suspension provision, the court determined that the legislature enacted the summary suspension provision as part of a concerted effort to remedy
the threat posed to public safety and welfare by drunk drivers.' 9
Because drunk drivers on public highways pose a greater threat to
the public safety than drunk drivers on private roadways, the court
11. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d at 496, 521 N.E.2d at 875. The defendant also challenged the
constitutionality of section 11-501.1 and section 6-206.1 of the Illinois Motor Vehicle
Code on due process and separation of powers grounds. Id. at 497, 521 N.E.2d at 875.
See infra notes 177-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of these challenges.
12. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d at 500, 521 N.E.2d at 877.
13. Id. at 502, 521 N.E.2d at 878.
14. Id. at 496, 521 N.E.2d at 875.
15. Id. at 504, 521 N.E.2d at 879. The supreme court permitted direct appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 302(a), which allows for direct appeal when "a statute
of the United States or of [Illinois] has been held invalid." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A,
para. 302(a) (1987). Most of the cases during the Survey year involved direct appeals to
the supreme court because the lower court had invalidated the contested statute.
16. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d at 499, 521 N.E.2d at 876-77.
17. Id. at 500, 521 N.E.2d at 877. In People v. Graziano, 151 Ill.
App. 3d 475, 502
N.E.2d 822 (2d Dist. 1986), the appellate court refused to recognize, as an identifiable
class, individuals arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol against whom the
evidence of intoxication was slight. Id. at 480, 502 N.E.2d at 826. Both Graziano and
Esposito reflect the judiciary's reluctance to recognize, as a protected class, persons
charged with violating the Illinois drunk driving laws. By refusing to recognize an identifiable class of persons, the courts can continue to resolve the equal protection challenges
strictly in terms of the rational relation test and not subject the statute to a stricter scrutiny. See generally GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 588.
18. Esposito, 121 Ill.
2d at 501, 521 N.E.2d at 877.
19. Id. at 501, 521 N.E.2d at 877-78.
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determined that the statute's distinction between the two groups
has a rational basis. 20 The court also held that the group of drivers
with a blood alcohol concentration of. 10 or greater sufficiently differs from drivers with a blood alcohol concentration of less than
.10, thereby justifying the statute's distinction between the two
groups. 2 ' Because the statute's distinction between the two groups
of drunk drivers bears a rational relation to the legislature's objective of remedying the threat to public safety posed by drunk drivers, the court held that section 11-501.1 does not violate the equal
protection clause.22
In People v. Watson,23 the court addressed an equal protection
challenge to the constitutionality of the aggravated battery statute
of the Illinois Criminal Code of 1961.24 The defendant's battery
charge was enhanced to aggravated battery because the victim was
a state public aid worker. The defendant contested the validity of
the enhancement provision of the battery statute because it drew a
distinction between state or county public aid workers and local
public aid workers.2 ' The circuit court agreed with the defendant's
argument and invalidated section 12-4(b)(5) of the criminal code as
violative of equal protection. The circuit court stated that the statute arbitrarily distinguishes between state and local public aid employees despite the fact that the two groups are similarly situated.26
20. Id.
21. Id. at 502-03, 521 N.E.2d at 878. In People v. Ziltz, 98 Ill. 2d 38, 455 N.E.2d 70
(1983), the court upheld the legislature's distinction between persons with a blood alcohol
concentration over .10 and persons with a blood alcohol concentration less than .10 for
purposes of the summary suspension statute. The court found that contrary to the plaintiff's assertions, the .10 limit provided a good indication of a person's state of intoxication. Id. at 43, 455 N.E.2d at 72.
22. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d at 504, 521 N.E.2d at 879.
23. 118 Ill. 2d 62, 514 N.E.2d 167 (1987).
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-4 (1983). The statute provides in relevant part:
"(b) A person who, in committing a battery, commits aggravated battery if he either:...
(5) Knows the individual harmed to be a caseworker, investigator or other person employed by the State Department of Public Aid or a County Department of Public Aid
.... " Id. Thus, section 12-4(b)(5) enhances battery to aggravated battery if the victim of
the crime was a state or county public aid officer.
25. Watson, 118 Ill. 2d at 64, 514 N.E.2d at 168. Prior to its resolution of the equal
protection challenge, the court determined that the defendant had standing to challenge
the constitutionality of the statute. Id. at 66, 514 N.E.2d at 169. Ordinarily, a party may
only assert its own rights. The court, however, found standing based on the fact that the
defendant was in imminent danger of sustaining an injury (Le., conviction) as a result of
the enforcement of the statute. The court ignored the fact that the only persons denied
equal protection under the statute were local public aid workers and that the defendant
was in neither of the classes of individuals treated differently by the statute. Id. at 64-65,
514 N.E.2d at 169.
26. Id. at 65, 514 N.E.2d at 169. The circuit court found that county, state, and local
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The supreme court reversed the circuit court's decision.
In reversing the circuit court, the court noted that the legislature
enacted the enhancement provisions of the battery statute in an
effort to provide greater protection to state and county public aid
employees.28 The court recognized that other provisions within
the battery statute permitted the enhancement of battery to aggravated battery where the victim was a peace officer 29 or a group
worker in a county youth detention home. 30 Given these special
provisions, the court reasoned that the legislature could enact statutes designed to offer greater protection to persons subjected to
greater risks in performing their official duties.31 The court found
that the evidence admitted at trial sufficiently showed that the risks
and dangers encountered by state and county public aid workers
32
exceeds the risks and dangers facing local public aid workers.
In light of the legislature's intent to provide greater protection to
the state and county public aid employees, and the differences between the two groups of public aid employees, the court concluded
that section 12-4(b)(5) does not violate the equal protection clauses
of the Illinois and federal constitutions.33 Thus, the court concluded that the enhancement provision of section 12-4(b)(5) is
constitutional. 34
In People v. Hare,35 the supreme court considered whether section 110-14 of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 violates equal protection in awarding five dollars per day36 to persons
public aid workers are all similarly situated individuals performing essentially the same
tasks. Id. at 67, 514 N.E.2d at 170. Because no true difference exists between the two
groups, the circuit court held that the statute's distinction between the two groups is
arbitrary, and violates equal protection. Id.
27. Id. at 69, 514 N.E.2d at 171.
28. Id. at 68, 514 N.E.2d at 170.
29. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-4(b)(6) (1983); People v. Hanson, 53 Ill. 2d
79, 289 N.E.2d 611 (1972) (affirming enhancement of battery to aggravated battery be-

cause victim was a peace officer).
30.
31.

See In re V.P., 139 Ill. App. 3d 786, 487 N.E.2d 638 (2d Dist. 1985).
Watson, 118Ill. 2d at 67,514 N.E.2d at 170. See People v. Tosch, 114Ill. 2d 474,

501 N.E.2d 1253 (1986) (legislature can distinguish between two similarly situated
groups when a rational basis exists for doing so).
32. Watson, 118 Ill. 2d at 68, 514 N.E.2d at 170.
33. Id. at 68-69, 514 N.E.2d at 170-71. The court summarily concluded that this case
involved neither a fundamental right nor a constitutionally suspect class and, therefore,
resolved the defendant's equal protection challenge in terms of the rational relation test.
Id.
34.
35.

Id. at 69, 514 N.E.2d at 171.
119 Ill. 2d 441, 519 N.E.2d 879 (1988).

36. Id. at 446, 519 N.E.2d at 880. Section 110-14 provides in pertinent part: "Any
person incarcerated on a bailable offense who does not supply bail and against who a fine
is levied on conviction of such offense shall be allowed a credit of [five dollars] for each
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who do not post bail, while providing no similar credit for persons
who do post bail. 37 The circuit court allowed the defendant to use
the five dollars per day credit to relieve his fine imposed pursuant
to the Violent Crime Victim Assistance Act.3" The appellate court
for the third district affirmed the trial court's grant of credit and
the State appealed.39
On appeal, the State argued that the five dollar per day credit
violates the guarantees of equal protection because it allows a five
dollar per day credit for persons who fail to post bail but not for
those who do post bail.' In rejecting this argument, the supreme
court noted that the statute does not threaten any right to bail and
that persons who post bail are not a constitutionally suspect class."
The court, therefore, determined that if a rational relation exists
between the statute and a valid legislative purpose,
the statute sat42
isfies the requirements of equal protection.
The State argued that no valid legislative purpose justifies the
monetary credit provision and, therefore, the statute's distinction
between the two groups of people is arbitrary and irrational.43 The
court rejected the State's argument, however, and noted that all
day so incarcerated upon application of the defendant." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.
110-14 (1987).
37. Hare, 119 Ill. 2d at 448, 519 N.E.2d at 881. The State also questioned the applicability of the five dollar per day credit to persons who had already used pre-bail custody
credit to reduce their jail sentence. Id. at 444, 519 N.E.2d at 879. The State argued that
the statute was ambiguous and therefore violated due process. For a discussion of the
due process argument, see infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
38. Hare, 119 Ill. 2d at 444-45, 519 N.E.2d at 880. The Violent Crime Victim Assistance Act creates a relief fund to provide monetary assistance to the victims of violent
crimes. The Act imposes monetary fines upon defendants convicted of violent crimes.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, paras. 501-511 (1985). In Hare, the defendant was convicted of
armed robbery, a violent crime, and fined $20 pursuant to the Violent Crime Victim
Assistance Act. Hare, 119 Ill. 2d at 444, 519 N.E.2d at 880.
39. Hare, 119 I11.
2d at 445, 519 N.E.2d at 880. The appellate court decision is reported at 144 Ill.
App. 3d 279, 494 N.E.2d 913 (3d Dist. 1986). Hare was consolidated
on appeal with People v. Holzhauer, 144 Ill. App. 3d 153, 494 N.E.2d 272 (4th Dist.
1986), rev'd, People v. Hare, 119 Ill. 2d 441, 519 N.E.2d 879 (1988). In Holzhauer, the
appellate court for the fourth district denied the defendant the monetary credit under
section 110-14. Id. at 156, 494 N.E.2d at 274. Noting the division among the second,
third, fourth, and fifth districts in addressing this issue, the supreme court consolidated
the cases on appeal. Hare, 119 Ill. 2d at 446, 519 N.E.2d at 880.
40. Hare, 119 I11.
2d at 448, 519 N.E.2d at 881.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. The State argued that in order to satisfy equal protection, the monetary credit
provision had to apply both to persons who fail to post bail and to persons who post bail
(i.e., pay every arrestee five dollars per day until the case goes to trial). Because the
monetary credit does not apply equally to both groups, the State argued that the credit
violates equal protection. Id.

1989]

Constitutional Law

legislation enjoys, a presumption of validity and rationality." The
Hare court further stated that the presumed rationality of the statute can only be rebutted by proving that the statute is, in fact,
irrational.4" Because the State failed to prove the lack of a rational
basis for the monetary credit provision, the court presumed that
the statute is rational.46 Consequently, the court ruled that the five
dollar per day credit provision of section 110-14 does not violate
the equal protection clause.
The Hare court's presumption of a rational relation between the
statute and the presumed objective, if used liberally, could form the
basis for rejecting almost all equal protection challenges to which
the rational relation test applies. If the court presumes both a rational legislative objective and a rational relation between the statute and this objective, the court places a considerable burden of
proof upon litigants challenging the validity of the statute in terms
of equal protection.
In Pre-School Owners Association v. DCFS,48 the court rejected
an equal protection challenge to the Child Care Act of 1969 (the
"Child Care Act"). 49 The plaintiffs, a group of over 200 day-care
centers, challenged the constitutionality of the Child Care Act.5
The plaintiffs contended that the exemptions to the definition of
"day-care centers," provided by section 2.09 of the Child Care Act,
unlawfully exempt certain categories of "day-care centers" from
regulation. This preferential treatment for certain types of day44. Id. at 448, 519 N.E.2d at 881-82. The presumption of validity accorded to the
statute by the Hare court is part of the traditional equal protection analysis, although the
courts have long been inconsistent in articulating the precise standard to be applied. This
inconsistency in the standard of review has resulted in varying degrees of deference to the
legislature's judgment. At times, courts will presume a valid legislative purpose, but will
analyze the statute to determine whether there is a rational relation between that purpose
and the law. See F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920). At other
times, courts will extend the presumption not only to the legislative purpose, but to the
rational relationship between that purpose and the statute. See Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). It is this latter, more deferential standard that the
court seemed to apply in Hare.
45. Hare, 119 Ill. 2d at 448, 519 N.E.2d at 881-82.
46. Id. at 448-49, 519 N.E.2d at 882.
47. Id. at 449, 519 N.E.2d at 882.
48. 119 Ill. 2d 268, 518 N.E.2d 1018 (1988).
49. Id. at 278, 518 N.E.2d at 1023 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, paras. 2211-2230
(1985)).
50. Id. at 273, 518 N.E.2d at 1021.
51. Id. Section 2.09 exempts three types of day-care programs from regulation under
the Act: (1) programs affiliated with a school or other institution already within the purview of authority of the State Board of Education, (2) programs operated on a temporary
basis, and (3) programs operated on federal property. Id. at 275, 518 N.E.2d at 1022.
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care programs, the plaintiffs alleged, violates equal protection. The
trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment,
holding section 2.09 unconstitutional. 2
In reversing the lower court, the supreme court examined the
exemptions provided under section 2.09 of the Child Care Act to
determine whether the exemptions bear a rational relation to a
valid legislative purpose.5 3 The court stated that section 2.09 exempts day-care programs which are already subject to regulation
either by the State Board of Education or, in the case of day-care
programs on federal property, by the federal government. 4 Additional regulation under the Child Care Act, the court reasoned, is
unnecessary. 5 Thus, the court concluded that the exemptions
under the Child Care Act bear a rational relation to the legislature's objective of avoiding multiple regulation of certain day-care
programs. 6 Accordingly, the court upheld the Act as con57
stitutional.
B. Due Process
During the Survey year, the court addressed two particular categories of due process challenges. The first category of due process
challenges included those challenges based upon an alleged ambiguity or conflict within a particular statute.5 8 The second category
of due process claims involved the procedural requirements of due
process.59 To resolve the due process challenges based upon an
ambiguity or conflict within a statute, the court offered definitive
interpretations of the allegedly ambiguous statutes."° Where a
valid interpretation of the statute was not possible, the court invali52. Id. at 272, 518 N.E.2d at 1020.
53. Id. at 275, 518 N.E.2d at 1022. The court summarily concluded that a fundamental right was not involved and the group affected by the legislation was not a constitutionally suspect class. Thus, the court applied a rational relation analysis to the statute.
Id. at 275-76, 518 N.E.2d at 1022.
54. Id. at 276, 518 N.E.2d at 1022.
55. Id. at 277, 518 N.E.2d at 1023.
56. Id. at 278, 518 N.E.2d at 1023.
57. Id.
58. An ambiguity or conflict within a statute deprives an individual of due process by
allowing discriminatory enforcement of the law or by leaving uncertain what conduct the
statute proscribed. Canteen Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 123 Ill. 2d 95, 525 N.E.2d
73 (1988); People v. Hare, 119 Ill. 2d 441, 519 N.E.2d 879 (1988); People v. Haywood,
118 I11. 2d 263, 515 N.E.2d 45 (1987); People v. Monroe, 118 Ill. 2d 298, 515 N.E.2d 42
(1987); Spinelli v. Immanuel Lutheran Evangelical Congregation, 118 Ill. 2d 389, 515
N.E.2d 1222 (1987).
59. For a discussion of the procedural due process cases, see infra notes 135-202 and
accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., People v. Hare, 119 Ill. 2d 441, 519 N.E.2d 879 (1988) (interpreting
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dated the statute as violative of due process. 6 '
In People v. Haywood,62 the court addressed a procedural due
process challenge to the criminal sexual assault statutes. 63 The de6
fendants were charged with aggravated criminal sexual assault
and criminal sexual assault. 65 Each count of the indictment alleged

that the defendants acted "by use of force" and caused "bodily

harm" to the victims. 6 6 The defendants moved to dismiss the in-

dictment, contending that the statutes are impermissibly vague because they fail to define the terms "use of force" and "bodily
harm. ' 67 The circuit court agreed with the defendants and held
the criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual assault
provisions impermissibly vague and overbroad.68 The State appealed the circuit court's ruling directly to the supreme court and
the supreme court reversed.69
In reversing the lower court, the supreme court noted that a
challenge to a statute on the grounds of vagueness will only succeed if a valid construction of the statute is impossible.7" The Haywood court determined that the words "force" and "harm" are not
so broad as to make valid application of the statute impossible. 7 1
The common sense meaning of the words "force" and "harm" provide an initial limitation to these terms.72 Furthermore, the court
found that the repealed provisions of the Criminal Sexual Assault
Act explicitly defined "use of force" as conduct done without the
section 110-14 of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, para. 110-14 (1985)).
61. See, e.g., People v. Monroe, 118 Ill. 2d 298, 515 N.E.2d 42 (1987) (invalidating
conflicting provisions of the Drug Paraphernalia Control Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
56 1/2, paras. 2101-2107 (1985)).
62. 118 Ill. 2d 263, 515 N.E.2d 45 (1987).
63. Id. at 266, 515 N.E.2d at 46.
64. Id. Section 12-14(a)(2) provides in pertinent part: "(a) The accused commits aggravated criminal sexual assault if he or she commits criminal sexual assault and ... (2)
. . . [causes] bodily harm to the victim." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-14(a)(2)
(1985).
65. Haywood, 118 Ill. 2d at 266, 515 N.E.2d at 46. Section 12-13(a)(1) provides in
pertinent part: "(a) The accused commits criminal sexual assault if he or she: (1) commits an act of sexual penetration by the use of force or threat of force .... " ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-13(a)(1) (1985).
66. Haywood, 118 Ill. 2d at 266-67, 515 N.E.2d at 47.
67. Id. at 266, 515 N.E.2d at 46.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 277, 515 N.E.2d at 52.
70. Id. at 270, 515 N.E.2d at 48. See People v. Wawczak, 109 Ill. 2d 244, 249, 486
N.E.2d 911, 913 (1985) (a statute will be invalidated when it is incapable of any valid
application).
71. Haywood, 118 Il. 2d at 270, 515 N.E.2d at 48.
72. Id.
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consent of the victim. 73 The court held that the definitions in the
repealed provisions of the Act still applied to the recodified provisions because the legislature did not intend the recodification of the
Criminal Sexual Assault Act to override and change the elements
of a criminal sexual offense. 74 By applying the former definition of
"force" to the recodified provisions of the Act, the court formulated a definitive interpretation of the statute. 7 The court reasoned that the crime of criminal sexual assault occurs when a
person commits an act of sexual penetration through the use of
force, without the victim's consent or against the will of the victim. 76 Based upon this valid construction of the criminal sexual
assault statutes, the court concluded that these statutes are not impermissibly vague.77 Accordingly, the court held the contested
statutes constitutional.78
In People v. Hare,7 9 the court provided a definitive interpretation
of both section 110-14 of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure
of 196380 and the Violent Crime Victim Assistance Act ("VCVA
Act").8" The issue in Hare was whether persons who had already
received pre-bail custody credit to reduce their jail sentence could
also receive the five dollar per day credit for pre-bail custody pro73. Id. at 271-72, 515 N.E.2d at 49. The defendants contended that the definition of
"use of force" as an act committed without the consent of the victim is impermissibly
vague. Id. at 273, 515 N.E.2d at 50. The court rejected this contention and held that the
definition is sufficiently specific because evidence showing the lack of consent usually also
shows the use of force. Id. at 274, 515 N.E.2d at 50.
74. Id. at 272-73, 515 N.E.2d at 49-50. The recodified sexual assault provisions replaced eight of the eleven code sections previously defining various sexual offenses. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 11-1 to 11-11.1 (1981). The revised criminal sexual assault
statutes criminalize all sexual assaults without regard to the sex of the victim or offender
and without designating the type of particular sexual act proscribed. HOUSE PROCEEDINGS, 83d Ill. Gen. Assem., at 162-63 (May 10, 1983). The recodification provides
greater uniformity in the laws proscribing criminal sexual conduct. Haywood, 118 I11.2d
at 271, 515 N.E.2d at 49.
75. Haywood, 118 Ill. 2d at 274, 515 N.E.2d at 50. In People v. Mays, 91Ill. 2d 251,
437 N.E.2d 633 (1982), the court defined the term "bodily harm" as used in the battery
statute as "some sort of physical pain or damage to the body, like lacerations, bruises or
abrasions, whether temporary or permanent .. " Id. at 256, 437 N.E.2d at 635-36. The
Haywood court considered this definition consistent with the common sense definition of
bodily harm, and, therefore, retained this definition for purposes of the Criminal Sexual
Assault Act. Haywood, 118 Ill. 2d at 274, 515 N.E.2d at 51-52.
76. Id. at 274, 515 N.E.2d at 50.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 277, 515 N.E.2d at 52.
79. 119 I11.2d 441, 444, 519 N.E.2d 879, 879 (1988).
80. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 110-14 (1987).
81. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, paras. 501-511 (1985). See supra notes 35-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of Hare in regards to the equal protection clause.
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vided by section 110-14.82
To resolve this issue, the court examined the plain language of
section 110-14 and found that the statute does not expressly exclude persons who already have received credit for pre-bail custody
from receipt of the monetary credit provided by the statute.8 3 Because the statute does not expressly prohibit a double credit for
pre-bail custody, the court concluded that persons who have received credit for pre-bail custody against later jail sentences also
are able to receive the five dollar per day credit for pre-bail
custody.84

The Hare court also considered whether a person could use the
monetary credit provided under section 110-14 to reduce or relieve
the amount of a subsequently imposed VCVA Act fine.8 5 At the
time of Hare's arrest, the monetary credit provision did not exclude the VCVA Act fines from the monetary credit issued under
section 110- 14.86 The State argued, however, that to allow the
credit to offset the fine would defeat the purpose of the VCVA
Act. 7 In support of its argument, the State contended that under
the 1986 amendment to the statute, the VCVA Act fines were expressly excluded from the monetary credit of section 110-14.88 The
82. Hare, 119 Ill. 2d at 444, 519 N.E.2d at 879. The appellate courts split on this
issue. The fourth and second districts disallowed the double credit for pre-bail custody.
People v. Holzhauer, 144 Ill. App. 3d 153, 494 N.E.2d 272 (4th Dist. 1987), rev'd, People
v. Hare, 119 Ill. 2d 441, 519 N.E.2d 879 (1988); People v. Love, 140 Ill. App. 3d 651, 489
N.E.2d 393 (2d Dist. 1986). The third and fifth districts allowed the double credit.
People v. Hare, 144 Ill. App. 3d 279, 494 N.E.2d 913 (3d Dist. 1986); People v. James,
133 Ill. App. 3d 623, 479 N.E.2d 344 (5th Dist. 1985).
83. Hare, 119 Ill. 2d at 447-48, 519 N.E.2d at 881.
84. Id. In reaching its conclusion, the court relied upon the rule of statutory construction that a court cannot read into a statute any exceptions or limitations other than
those expressly provided by the plain language of the statute. In re Estate of Swiecicki,
106 Ill. 2d 111, 120, 477 N.E.2d 488, 491 (1985).
85. Hare, 119 Ill. 2d at 449, 519 N.E.2d at 882. The VCVA Act imposes relatively
small fines upon persons convicted of violent crimes. The purpose of the fines is to generate revenue to assist the victims of violent crimes. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, paras. 501-511
(1985).
86. Section 510(b) of the VCVA Act stated in pertinent part: "When any person is
convicted in Illinois after January 1, 1984 of an offense listed below, the court which
enters the conviction shall impose, in addition to any other penalty.., a fine in accordance with the following schedule, (1) $25.00 for conviction of a crime of violence .. .
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 510(b) (Supp. 1984).
87. Hare, 119 Ill. 2d at 449, 519 N.E.2d at 882.
88. Id. at 450, 519 N.E.2d at 882. The 1986 amendment to section 10(b) of the
VCVA Act provides in pertinent part:
When any person is convicted in Illinois after January 1, 1984, of an offense
listed below, the court which enters the conviction shall impose ... a fine, not
subject to the provision of section 110-14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of
1963, as amended, in accordance with the following schedule ....
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State argued that the amendment reflects the original intent of the
legislature to exempt VCVA Act fines from the monetary credit
provision and, therefore, prevented the defendant from using this
monetary credit to relieve his twenty dollar VCVA Act fine.8 9 On
the other hand, the defendant contended that the 1986 amendment
represents a change in the law and, therefore, did not apply retroactively to the facts of this case. 90
The Hare court found that the VCVA Act as originally enacted
contained clear, specific language and was not ambiguous. 91 It
concluded that the legislature intended the amendment to the
VCVA Act to effect a change in the law. 92 Accordingly, the court
held that the exclusion of VCVA Act fines from the monetary
credit provision of section 110-14 did not apply to Hare and that
he was entitled to use the monetary credit to relieve his VCVA Act
fine. 93
Unlike the court's finding in Haywood and Hare, in People v.
Monroe94 the court could not provide a valid interpretation of the
challenged statute and, therefore, held that the conflicting provisions of the statute violated due process. 95 In Monroe, the defendants were arrested and charged with violating the Drug
Paraphernalia Control Act (the "DPC Act"), which prohibited the
sale of any equipment used in connection with the use of illegal
drugs.96 The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment on the
grounds that the DPC Act was unconstitutionally vague with respect to the mental state requirements defined by sections 2(d) and
3(a) of the DPC Act. 97 The circuit court granted the defendants'
motion and held the statute unconstitutionally vague. 9
In affirming the lower court's decision, the supreme court exILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 510(b)(1985).
89. Hare, 119 I11.2d at 449, 519 N.E.2d at 882.
90. Id. at 450-51, 519 N.E.2d at 883. Generally, if a statute as originally enacted
contains an ambiguity, a subsequent amendment to the statute will be viewed as a clarification of the original intent of the statute. Id. at 451, 519 N.E.2d at 883. If the language
of the statute is clear, however, a subsequent amendment will be viewed as a change in
the law. Id.
91. Id. at 451-52, 519 N.E.2d at 883.
92. Id. at 452, 519 N.E.2d at 883.
93. Id. at 452-53, 519 N.E.2d at 883-84.
94. 118 Ill. 2d 298, 515 N.E.2d-42 (1987).
95. Id. at 305, 515 N.E.2d at 45.
96. Id. at 299, 515 N.E.2d at 42. The DPC Act prohibited the possession, delivery,
and sale of drug paraphernalia. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, paras. 2101-2107 (1985).
97. Monroe, 118 Ill. 2d at 301, 515 N.E.2d at 43.
98. Id. at 299, 515 N.E.2d at 42.
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amined the allegedly conflicting sections of the DPC Act. 99
The court found that section 2(d) of the DPC Act required the
offender to have actual knowledge that the goods sold constituted
drug paraphernalia.1°° In contrast, section 3(a) of the DPC Act
stated that a violation of the Act occurred when a person knew or
under the circumstances should have known that the goods sold
constituted drug paraphernalia.'"I Section 3(a), therefore, required
only constructive knowledge on the part of the offender. Given the
apparent disparity in mental state requirements between sections
2(d) and 3(a) of the DPC Act, the court determined that the statute failed to define the prohibited conduct. 0 2 Consequently, the
court held the statute impermissibly vague and, therefore,

unconstitutional. 103

°4

In Spinelli v. Immanuel Lutheran Evangelical Congregation,
the court held unconstitutional the Act Permitting Employees To

Review Their Personnel Records (the "Records Review Act") 0 5
because of an inconsistency between sections 2 and 10 of the
Act. 0 6 In Spinelli, the plaintiff, a school teacher who had been

fired by her employer, requested to review her personnel files. 107
The employer complied with the teacher's request but excluded
certain letters of reference from the disclosed materials. The employer claimed that the letters were part of the employer's "man-

agement planning," and, therefore, were exempted from the
99. Id. at 301-02, 515 N.E.2d at 43-44.
100. Id. at 303, 515 N.E.2d at 44. Section 2(d) of the DPC Act defined drug paraphernalia as any item "peculiar to and marketed for use with [illegal drugs]." ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 56 1/2, para. 2102(d) (1985). The court held that in defining drug paraphernalia in terms of marketing, section 2(d) implied that actual knowledge was required under
the DPC Act. The court reasoned that one cannot unknowingly sell an item for a particular use. Monroe, 118 Ill. 2d at 304, 515 N.E.2d at 44. Consequently, the court held that
according to section 2(d), a violation of the DPC Act occurred only when the defendant
had actual knowledge that the goods sold constituted drug paraphernalia. Id. at 303, 515
N.E.2d at 44.
101. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, para. 2103(a) (1985).
102. Monroe, 118 Ill. 2d at 305, 515 N.E.2d at 45.
103. Id.
104. 118 Ill. 2d 389, 515 N.E.2d 1222 (1987).
105. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 2001-2012 (Supp. 1984).
106. Spinelli, 118 Ill. 2d at 403, 515 N.E.2d at 1228. Section 2 of the Records Review
Act provided employees with the right to review personnel records containing information related to the employee's qualifications for promotion, transfer, additional compensation, or discharge. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 2002 (Supp. 1984). Section 10
contained a list of materials excluded from an employee's right of review, including
materials related to "management planning." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 2010 (Supp.
1984).
107. Spinelli, 118 Ill. 2d at 396, 515 N.E.2d at 1225.
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plaintiff's review."°8 The plaintiff sought a court order compelling
production of the documents. The circuit court granted the plaintiff's request and ordered the employer to produce the withheld
materials. 10 9 The employer appealed and the appellate court rescinded the trial court's order to compel production. " 0 The appellate court ruled that the Records Review Act was
unconstitutionally vague in regards to the exemption under section
10(c) for materials related to "management planning."'. Subsequently, the Attorney General intervened and appealed the appellate court's decision. 1 2 The issue on appeal to the supreme court
was whether the term "management planning" in section 10(c),
when read in conjunction with section 2 of the Records Review
Act, permitted a person of ordinary intelligence to determine
which personnel documents were subject to disclosure and which
documents were excluded from an employee's review.113
Section 2 of the Records Review Act provided employees with
the right to review documents used in relation to the employer's
hiring, promotion, and termination decisions." 4 The court held
that, ordinarily, decisions regarding hiring, promotion, and termination comprised part of the employer's "management planning.""' 5 Because section 10(c) excluded documents related to
"management planning" from an employee's review, the court held
that section 10(c) necessarily conflicted with section 2 and made a
valid interpretation of the Records Review Act impossible." 6 The
court, therefore, concluded that an employee of ordinary intelligence would not be able to determine accurately which documents
were subject to disclosure and which were not subject to disclosure.7 Accordingly, the court held the Records Review Act
18
unconstitutional.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 394, 515 N.E.2d at 1224. The appellate court decision is reported at 144
I11.App. 3d 325, 494 N.E.2d 196 (2d Dist. 1986). Spinelli was consolidated on appeal
with Kamrath v. Boardof Education. See infra notes 138-47 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Kamrath.
113. Spinelli, 118 Ill. 2d at 401, 515 N.E.2d at 1227.
114. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 2002 (Supp. 1984).
115. Spinelli, 118 I11.2d at 401-02, 515 N.E.2d at 1227-28.
116. Id. at 403, 515 N.E.2d at 1228.
117. Id.
118. Id. It is not clear from the court's opinion whether the court invalidated the
entire Records Review Act or just the conflicting provisions. Furthermore, the effect of
Spinelli on the Records Review Act is uncertain in light of the fact that the act has not
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In Canteen Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 119 the supreme
court invalidated a Department of Revenue regulation on the
ground that the regulation violated due process by improperly extending the scope of the Retailers Occupation Tax Act ("ROT
Act"). 21 Section 2 of the ROT Act taxes, at a reduced rate, food
that is not consumed on the premises of the sale. In contrast, foods
produced for immediate consumption receive no reduction in the
tax rate.' 2 1 Canteen Corporation ("Canteen") contended that the
majority of its vending machine sales involved food items consumed off the premises and food items not specifically produced for
immediate consumption. 22 Consequently, Canteen claimed that
the reduced rate of tax should be applied to its vending machine
sales.' 23 The Department of Revenue, however, defined all vending
124
machine food sales as sales of food for immediate consumption.
The Department therefore denied Canteen's claim for tax credit
based on its alleged overpayment of the retailers occupation tax. 125
On administrative review, the circuit court held that the Department's regulation, which defined all sales of vending machines as
sales for immediate consumption, was unconstitutional because it
was inconsistent with the provisions of the ROT Act.' 26 The De27
partment of Revenue appealed directly to the supreme court.
yet been repealed by the Illinois General Assembly. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para.
2010 (1985), amended by P.A. 85-1393, 1988 Ill. Legis. Serv. 6 (West).
119. 123 Ill. 2d 95, 525 N.E.2d 73 (1988).
120. Id. at 108, 525 N.E.2d at 78-79. The ROT Act imposes a tax upon all persons
selling personal property at retail in Illinois. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, paras. 440-452 1/2
(1987).
121. Section 2 of the ROT Act provides in pertinent part: "[W]ith respect to food for
human consumption which is to be consumed off the premises from where it is sold...
such tax shall be imposed [under this section] at the rate of 0%." ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
120, para. 441 (1987).
122. Canteen Corp., 123 Ill. 2d at 107, 111, 525 N.E.2d at 78, 80.
123. Id. Canteen filed a claim for credit with the Department of Revenue for overpayment of the Retailers Occupation Tax for the years 1980-83. Id.
124. Id. at 102-03, 525 N.E.2d at 76. Illinois Department of Revenue Regulation
130-310(b)(2)(C) provided in pertinent part:
2) Gross receipts from sales of food for which facilities are provided so that it
can be consumed on the premises where it is sold and gross receipts from sales
of food which has been prepared for immediate consumption do not qualify for
the reduced rate [of tax]. For example: . . .
C) sales of food items in vending machines are sales of food for immediate
consumption.
ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 130.310 (1985).
125. Canteen Corp., 123 Ill. 2d at 99, 525 N.E.2d at 74.
126. Id.
127. Id. Rule 302(b) permits direct appeal when the "public interest requires prompt
adjudication by the Supreme Court." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 0A, para. 302(b) (1987).
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On appeal, the supreme court considered whether the Department's regulation improperly extended the provisions of the ROT
Act, thereby violating Canteen's due process rights.12
The court held that, in defining all vending machine sales as
sales of food for immediate consumption, the Department's regulation improperly extended the scope of the ROT Act.1 29 The evidence presented at trial conclusively established that the majority
of Canteen's vending machine sales did not involve food produced
for immediate consumption.13° The evidence also established that
the majority of the food sold through the vending machines was
consumed off the premises.'
The court concluded that the Department's categorization of all vending machine food sales as sales
of food for immediate consumption failed to recognize the production and "off-the-premises" requirements of the ROT Act.1 32 The
court, therefore, held that the regulation was overbroad and an improper extension of the ROT Act. 3 3 Consequently, the court ruled
34
that the regulation violated due process. 1
In addition to the due process challenges based upon an alleged
ambiguity or conflict in a statute, the court also addressed procedural due process challenges to certain statutes during the Survey
year. Procedural due process demands that an individual be acThe court apparently considered the purported ambiguity or internal conflict within the
ROT Act of sufficient "public interest" to permit direct appeal.
128. Canteen Corp., 123 Ill. 2d at 99, 525 N.E.2d at 74-75.
129. Id. at 108, 525 N.E.2d at 78-79.
130. Id. at 107, 525 N.E.2d at 78. In determining whether the food items sold
through vending machines constituted sales of food for immediate consumption, the
court focused upon the production of these food items, not on the marketing strategy of
vending machine sales. Id. at 108-09, 525 N.E.2d at 79. The evidence showed that the
food items sold through the vending machines were produced in the same manner as the
identical food items sold in grocery stores and other shops. Id. at 107, 525 N.E.2d at 78.
Because the plaintiff showed that the majority of food sold through its vending machines
was not producedfor immediate consumption, the sales qualified for the reduced tax rate
under section 2 of the ROT Act. Id.
131. Id. at 111, 525 N.E.2d at 80. The Department argued that, for purposes of
vending machine sales, "premises" included the entire building in which the vending
machines were located. Id. at 110, 525 N.E.2d at 79. The court rejected this proposed
definition and instead adopted the definition of "premises" contained in the regulation.
Subsection (b)(2) and (b)(3) limited "premises" to those areas of the building that provided facilities for eating the sold items. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 130.310(b)(2),
(b)(3) (1985).
132. Canteen Corp., 123 Ill. 2d at 108, 111, 525 N.E.2d at 78-80.
133. Id. at 108, 525 N.E.2d at 78-79. The court did not address the plaintiff's challenge to the regulation as violative of the uniformity clause of the Illinois Constitution,
ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 2, because it had already invalidated the regulation as inconsistent
with section 2 of the ROT Act. Canteen Corp., 123 Ill. 2d at 112, 525 N.E.2d at 80.
134. Canteen Corp., 123 Ill. 2d at 112, 525 N.E. 2d at 80.
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corded notice and a fair hearing prior to a deprivation of a particular right or property interest. 135 The court has noted, however,
that a compelling state interest may warrant deprivation of a property interest prior to an evidentiary hearing.136 When a compelling
state interest is not involved, notice and a pre-deprivation37 hearing
are required in order to satisfy procedural due process.

In Kamrath v. Board of Education,138 the plaintiff challenged the
local school board's suspension hearing as violative of his procedural due process rights. 3 9 The local school board suspended the
plaintiff for using obscene language and for being abusive towards
his students." 4 The plaintiff contested the school board's suspension, arguing that the school board failed to follow the procedures
outlined in section 24-12 of the school code.' 4 ' The court rejected
the plaintiff's procedural due process arguments and held that section 24-12 does not apply to suspension hearings. 42 The court
135. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (due process of law requires that a
person be provided notice and the opportunity for a hearing prior to the deprivation of
property).
136. See People v. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d 491, 521 N.E.2d 873 (1988).
137. See Spinelli v. Immanuel Lutheran Evangelical Congregation, 118 Ill. 2d 389,
406, 525 N.E.2d 1222, 1230 (1987) (due process requires notice and the opportunity for a
fair hearing prior to deprivation of property). See also Wilson v. Bishop, 82 Ill. 2d 364,
412 N.E.2d 522 (1980).
138. 118 Ill. 2d 389, 525 N.E.2d 1222 (1988). Kamrath was consolidated on appeal
with Spinelli v. Immanuel Lutheran Evangelical Congregation because Kamrath's complaint included a challenge to the constitutionality of the Records Review Act, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 48, paras. 2001-2012 (Supp. 1984). After the appellate court in Spinelli declared the Records Review Act unconstitutional, the appellate court in Kamrath dismissed that portion of Kamrath's complaint. For further discussion of Spinelli, see supra
notes 104-18 and accompanying text.
139. Kamrath, 118 Ill. 2d at 398, 515 N.E.2d at 1226. The plaintiff also contested the
school board's power to suspend a tenured teacher. The court rejected the plaintiff's
contention and held that the school board had the power to suspend a tenured teacher
pursuant to section 10-20.5 of the Illinois School Code, which authorizes the school
board to enforce all rules necessary for the proper government and maintenance of a
school. Id. at 404-05, 515 N.E.2d at 1229 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, para. 10-20.5
(1985)). Cf. Craddock v. Board of Educ., 76 Ill. App. 3d 43, 391 N.E.2d 1059 (3d Dist.
1979) (local school board's authority to suspend a tenured teacher stemmed from the
dismissal procedures outlined in section 24-12 of the school code).
140. Spinelli, 118 Ill. 2d at 397, 515 N.E.2d at 1225.
141. Id. at 394-95, 515 N.E.2d at 1224. In reliance upon Craddock, the plaintiff argued that because the school board's power to suspend a tenured teacher stemmed from
section 24-12, the school board had to comply with the suspension procedures outlined in
that section. Id.
142. Id. The court held section 24-12 inapplicable to suspension hearings because it
located the board's authority to suspend a tenured teacher under section 10-20.5 of the
school code, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, para. 10-20.5 (1987). Section 10-20.5 authorizes
the board to enforce all rules necessary to govern a school properly. Id. The court reasoned that because section 24-12 specifically addressed dismissal procedures and not suspension procedures, it did not apply when the school board suspends a tenured teacher.
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then evaluated the suspension hearing procedure followed in the
plaintiff's case to determine whether these procedures satisfied procedural due process. 143
According to the school board's suspension procedure, a teacher
must receive written notice of the suspension and a summary of the
charges upon which the school board based its decision. 14 The
suspension procedure also allows the teacher to request a hearing. 145 At the hearing, the teacher has the right to be represented
by counsel, to present evidence on his own behalf, and to crossexamine the witnesses testifying against him.1 46 The court stated
that these suspension hearing requirements fully satisfy procedural
due process requirements and, therefore, do not violate the plain147
tiff's due process rights.

In People v. Porter,148 the court rejected the defendants' procedural due process challenge to section 122-2.1 of the Illinois Code
of Criminal Procedure. 149 Section 122-2.1 authorizes the court to
dismiss the defendants' post-conviction petition for retrial prior to
the appointment of counsel. 5 The defendants contended that section 122-2.1 deprives them, as indigent petitioners, of their due
process right to equal access to the courts.'
Spinelli, 118 Ill. 2d at 405, 515 N.E.2d at 1229-30 (citing Craddock, 76 111. App. 3d at 49,
391 N.E.2d at 1063 (Alloy, J., dissenting)).
143. Id. at 406, 515 N.E.2d at 1230. The court noted that procedural due process
requires that a person be accorded fair notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to
any deprivation of property by the state or local agency. See Wilson v. Bishop, 82 Ill. 2d
364, 369, 412 N.E.2d 522, 524-25 (1980).
144. Spinelli, 118 Ill. 2d at 406, 515 N.E.2d at 1230.
145. Id. at 406-07, 515 N.E.2d at 1230.
146. Id. at 407, 515 N.E.2d at 1230.
147. Id.
148. 122 Ill. 2d 64, 521 N.E.2d 1158 (1988).
149. Id. at 73, 521 N.E.2d at 1161. Section 122-2.1 states in pertinent part: "If the
court determines the [petition for retrial] is frivolous or is patently without merit, it shall
dismiss the petition in a written order, specifying the findings of fact and conclusions of
law it made in reaching its decision." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-2.1 (1987).
150. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d at 74, 521 N.E.2d at 1161. The defendants also contended
that section 122-2.1 violates the separation of powers doctrine. See infra notes 236-56
and accompanying text. In addition, the defendants argued that section 122-2.1 violates
equal protection because indigent post-conviction petitioners have no automatic right to
counsel while indigent direct appellants had such a right pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 607(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 607(a) (1987). Porter, 122 Ill. 2d at 78, 521
N.E.2d at 1163. Nevertheless, the court summarily disposed of the defendant's equal
protection claim and reaffirmed the analysis and holding of People v. Baugh, 132 Ill.
App. 3d 713, 477 N.E.2d 724 (4th Dist. 1985) (a rational basis existed for treating postconviction petitioners and post-conviction appellants differently).
151. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d at 73, 521 N.E.2d at 1161. Procedural due process demands
that indigents have a meaningful opportunity to present their grievances in court. People
v. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d 289, 391 N.E.2d 366 (1979).
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In three separate cases, the circuit courts disagreed with the defendants' argument, and dismissed the post-conviction petitions for
retrial.' 52 On appeal, the second and fifth divisions of the Illinois
Appellate Court for the First District affirmed the circuit court's
dismissal and upheld the statute as constitutional. 53 The fourth
division of the First Appellate District, however, reversed the circuit court's dismissal and held the statute unconstitutional as violative of separation of powers and due process.' 5" The cases were
subsequently consolidated on appeal to the supreme court. 55
On appeal, the supreme court reversed the lower courts.1 56 The
court based its decision upon the United States Supreme Court's
holding that the failure to appoint counsel prior to a post-conviction petition for retrial does not violate the petitioner's rights to
due process of law under the federal constitution.- 7 The court reasoned that because federal due process does not require the appointment of counsel prior to a post-conviction petition, due
process under the Illinois Constitution also does not require the
appointment of counsel prior to a post-conviction petition. 58
Therefore, the court concluded that in allowing for the dismissal of
a post-conviction petition prior to the appointment of counsel, section 122-2.1 does not violate the petitioners' right to due process of
law. 159
Justice Simon dissented from the majority opinion with respect
to its due process findings.' I Simon stated that the court erred in
failing to recognize the established differences between Illinois due
process requirements and federal due process requirements.' 6' According to Simon, the court's interpretations of the 1961 Post-Con152. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d at 69-70, 521 N.E.2d at 1159.
153. See People v. Singleton, 143 Ill. App. 3d 1159, 507 N.E.2d 555 (1st Dist. 1986);
People v. Porter, 141 Ill. App. 3d 208, 490 N.E.2d 47 (1st Dist. 1986).
154. See People v. Mason, 145 Ill. App. 3d 218, 494 N.E.2d 1176 (1st Dist. 1986).
155. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d at 70, 521 N.E.2d at 1159.
156. Id. at 76, 521 N.E.2d at 1162.
157. Id. at 74-75, 521 N.E.2d at 1161-62 (citing Rodriguez v. United States, 395 U.S.
327 (1969)). In Rodriguez, the Court approved the federal habeas corpus statute which
requires an indigent petitioner to prepare his petition for retrial without the benefit of
counsel. Rodriquez, 395 U.S. at 330.
158. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d at 75, 521 N.E.2d at 1161-62. The Portercourt presumed that
the Illinois requirements for due process parallel the federal requirements because the
language of the due process clauses in the state and federal constitutions is nearly identical. Id. at 76, 521 N.E.2d at 1162.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 86, 521 N.E.2d at 1167 (Simon, J., dissenting). Justice Simon also dissented from the majority regarding the defendants' separation of powers challenge. Id. at
93, 521 N.E.2d at 1170 (Simon, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 87-88, 521 N.E.2d at 1167-68 (Simon, J., dissenting).
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viction Act immediately prior to the adoption of the Illinois
Constitution of 1970 evidenced the court's position that the due
process requirements in Illinois exceed the requirements of the federal constitution. 16 2 Simon argued that the delegates to the Illinois
constitutional convention in 1970 intended to incorporate the judicially established due process requirements into the due process
requirements under the new constitution.1 63 Simon thus felt that
the majority erred by evaluating the defendant's due process chal64
lenge strictly in terms of the federal due process requirements.1
The resignation of Justice Simon from the bench may signal the
end of the debate over the difference between the due process requirements of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 and the federal constitution. Justice Simon consistently argued for the expansion of
the Illinois due process clause and rejected efforts to adopt uniformly federal interpretations of due process requirements. With
Simon's resignation, any expansion of the Illinois due process requirements beyond the federal requirements seems unlikely in the
near future.
Three cases raised procedural due process challenges with respect to the summary suspension of driver's licenses under the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code. 65 In People v. Hamilton,166 for example,
the defendant contended that section 2-118.1 (b) of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code 1 67 violates procedural due process by preventing a
party from contesting the validity of the blood alcohol concentradissenting). See People v. Butler, 40
162. Id. at 88-89, 521 N.E.2d at 1168 (Simon, J.,
Ill. 2d 386, 240 N.E.2d 592 (1968) (case remanded for appointment of counsel prior to
disposition of the defendant's petition for retrial).
163. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d at 88-89, 521 N.E.2d at 1167-68 (Simon, J., dissenting). Justice Simon argued that this intent to expand the due process requirements under the
Illinois Constitution applied despite the fact that the Illinois Constitution of 1970
adopted a due process clause nearly identical to that of the federal constitution. Id. at 88,
521 N.E.2d at 1167-68 (Simon, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 90, 521 N.E.2d at 1169 (Simon, J.,dissenting). Justice Simon also based
his dissent from the majority's due process decision upon Supreme Court Justice Brennan's statement that state court judges should expand the protection of due process
within their respective states beyond the protection enumerated by the federal courts. Id.
at 87, 521 N.E.2d at 1167 (Simon, J.,
dissenting). See Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the
States: The Revival of State Constitutionsas Guardiansof Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 535, 549 (1986); Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 502-03 (1977).
165. People v. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d 491, 521 N.E.2d 873 (1988); People v. Gerke, 123
I11.
2d 85, 525 N.E.2d 68 (1988); People v. Hamilton, 118 Ill. 2d 153, 514 N.E.2d 965
(1987).
166. 118 I11.
2d 153, 514 N.E.2d 965 (1987).
167. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 2-118.1 (1987). Section 2-118.1 provides in
pertinent part: "Upon notice of statutory summary suspension served under section 11501.1, the person may make a written request for a judicial hearing in the circuit court of
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tion test at a rescission hearing.' 6' The circuit court agreed with
the defendant's argument and held section 2-118.1 (b) invalid as violative of procedural due process. 169 The State appealed directly to
the supreme court,
and the supreme court reversed the circuit
170
court's decision.

The court held that the testing standards defined in section 11501.2 of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code 17' apply to the summary
suspension proceedings outlined under section 11-501.1 of the
Code. 72 The court recognized that failure to comply with the test
standards promulgated under section 11-501.2 of the Code render
the test results inadmissible in a criminal drunk driving prosection. 173 The court concluded that because compliance with the
testing standards is mandatory, and tests that do not comply with
these standards are held inadmissible, the licensee must be allowed
74
to challenge the validity of the test results at a rescission hearing.
Section 2-118. 1(b) does not preempt this right of the licensee to
contest the validity of
the test results' 75 and, therefore, does not
176
violate due process.

In People v. Esposito,177 the court rejected a procedural due process challenge to the provision of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code
venue. The request to the circuit court shall state the grounds upon which the person
seeks to have the statutory summary suspension rescinded.
...
Id.
168. Hamilton, 118 Ill. 2d at 155, 514 N.E.2d at 967. In Hamilton, the defendant
was arrested while driving under the influence of alcohol. Id. at 154, 514 N.E.2d at 966.
His breath test revealed a blood alcohol concentration slightly over the legal blood alcohol concentration limit of. 10. Id. The defendant's license was summarily suspended for
three months pursuant to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 11-501.1 (1987), and he
subsequently petitioned the court for a rescission hearing. Hamilton, 118 Ill. 2d at 155,
514 N.E.2d at 967. He also filed a motion to dismiss the criminal charges as violative of
due process. Id. Section 2-118.1 (b) purportedly violates due process by unlawfully limiting the possible defenses that a defendant could raise at a recission hearing. Id. at 157,
514 N.E.2d at 968.
169. Hamilton, 118 Ill. 2d at 155, 514 N.E.2d at 967.
170. Id. at 162, 514 N.E.2d at 970.
171. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 11-501.2 (1987). Section 11-501.2 promulgates the procedure to be followed in administering the "analysis of the person's blood,
urine, breath or other bodily substance." Id.
172. Hamilton, 118 Ill. 2d at 160, 514 N.E.2d at 969.
173. Id. See People v. Emrich, 113 Ill. 2d 343, 498 N.E.2d 1140 (1986) (failure of the
blood alcohol test to comply with the standards promulgated under section 11-501.2 warranted exclusion of the test results from evidence in a criminal drunk driving
prosecution).
174. Hamilton, 118 Ill. 2d at 160, 514 N.E.2d at 969.
175. Id. at 161, 514 N.E.2d at 970.
176. Id. The court resolved the defendants' due process challenge on statutory
grounds and declined to comment upon whether the legislature could constitutionally
limit the possible defenses raised at a rescission hearing. Id. at 158, 514 N.E.2d at 968.
177. 121 Ill. 2d 491, 521 N.E.2d 873 (1988).

296

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 20

which authorizes the summary suspension of a driver's license
where the driver's blood alcohol concentration exceeds the legal
limit. 7

8

Following the summary suspension of her driver's license,

the defendant filed a petition to rescind the summary suspension.
The defendant claimed that the summary suspension provision deprives Illinois drivers of due process of law because the drivers are
not allowed to have an evidentiary hearing prior to the summary
suspension."' The circuit court granted the defendant's petition to
rescind the summary suspension, and invalidated section 11-501.1
as violative of due process.' 80 The State appealed directly to the
supreme court. On appeal, the court considered whether the failure to afford licensees an evidentiary hearing prior to the suspension of their licenses violates the licensee's right to due process of
81

law.1

Applying the test developed in Mathews v. Eldridge,'82 the court
concluded that: (1) neither the nature nor the weight of the individual's interest in having a driver's license requires an evidentiary
hearing prior to suspension of a driver's license in order to satisfy
the requirements of due process;' 83 (2) the summary suspension
178. Id. at 504, 521 N.E.2d at 879. Section 11-501.1 of the motor vehicle code provides in pertinent part: "If the person... submits to a test which discloses an alcohol
concentration of 0.10 or more[,] . . . the Secretary of State shall enter the statutory suspension for the periods specified in section 6-208.1 [of the motor vehicle code] .... " ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 11-501.1 (1987).
179. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d at 496, 521 N.E.2d at 875. The defendant also challenged
the validity of section 6-206.1 of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95
1/2, para. 6206.1 (1987). Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d at 512, 521 N.E.2d at 882. Section 6-206.1
authorizes the court to issue judicial driving permits to parties demonstrating the need to
drive in order to continue employment or to obtain necessary medical supplies or treatment. The court determined that the defendant lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of this statute because she had not been adversely affected by its provisions. Id.
at 512-13, 521 N.E.2d at 882-83.
180. Id. at 497, 521 N.E.2d at 875.
181. Id. at 504, 521 N.E.2d at 879.
182. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The Eldridge Court developed a test to determine when an
evidentiary hearing prior to the deprivation of a property interest is necessary to satisfy
procedural due process. The test provides three measures: (1) the nature and weight of
the private interest which may be impaired by the challenged process; (2) the likelihood
that the impairment will be erroneous and the value of substitute procedures; and (3) the
government's interest, including the fiscal and administrative difficulties of additional or
alternative procedures. Id. at 335.
183. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d at 507, 521 N.E.2d 880. The court determined the actual
weight of the individual's interest in the possession of a driver's license through consideration of the following factors: (1) the duration of the suspension; (2) the availability of
post-suspension review; and (3) the availability of relief in certain circumstances. Id. at
506, 521 N.E.2d at 880. After fully examining these three factors, the court concluded
that the summary suspension is of reasonably limited duration, that post-suspension review is available, and that judicial driving permits are available in cases of need. Id. at
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procedure is not likely to result in an erroneous deprivation of the
individual's interest in having a license; 84 and (3) the statute provides a reasonable and efficient means to protect persons travelling
on highways from drunk drivers.8 5 Given the satisfaction of the
requirements outlined in the Eldridge test, the court concluded
that the suspension of a driver's license prior to an evidentiary
hearing does not deprive Illinois drivers of due process of law, and
the court upheld the summary suspension provision. 8 6
In People v. Gerke,18 7 the court expanded the Esposito decision
and held that a one-year summary suspension of a repeat offender's
driver's license did not violate due process. 8 In Gerke, following
the defendant's arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol,
the state summarily suspended her driver's license for one year."19
The trial court later rescinded the summary suspension following
the prosecution's nolle prosequi motion to dismiss. 90 The appellate
court reversed the trial court's rescission of the suspension, holding
that the trial court did not have the discretion to rescind the summary suspension based upon disposition of the criminal charges. I
The appellate court also reinstated the one-year suspension of the
507, 521 N.E.2d at 880. Thus, the existing provisions of the summary suspension provision adequately protect the individual's interest in the continued possession of a driver's
license, and a pre-suspension hearing is unnecessary. Id.
184. Id. at 509, 521 N.E.2d at 880-81. In reaching this decision, the court vested
much confidence in the powers of observation of the arresting officer as a "trained observer and investigator." Id. at 508, 521 N.E.2d at 881 (quoting Mackey v. Montrym,
443 U.S. 1, 14 (1979) (upholding a Massachusetts law which authorized summary suspension of a driver's license prior to a hearing when the driver refused to take a breath
test)). The input of an observer, the Esposito court stated, assures the individual that the
summary suspension will not occur erroneously and arbitrarily. Id. at 509-10, 521
N.E.2d at 881.
185. Id. at 510, 521 N.E.2d at 881-82. The court reasoned that the prompt suspension of a driver's license prevents administrative inefficiency and provides a more immediate means of securing the public safety and welfare from the threat of drunk drivers. Id.
See also Mackey, 443 U.S. at 18 ("A presuspension hearing would substantially undermine the state interest in public safety by giving drivers significant incentive ... to demand a presuspension hearing as a dilatory tactic.").
186. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d at 511, 521 N.E.2d at 882.
187. 123 Ill. 2d 85, 525 N.E.2d 68 (1988).
188. Id. at 90, 525 N.E.2d at 71.
189. Id. at 88, 525 N.E.2d at 70. Section 6-208.1(a)(3) of the Illinois Motor Vehicle
Code authorizes the Secretary of State to suspend a driver's license for one year when the
driver has been arrested previously for driving under the influence of alcohol. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 6-208.1(a)(3) (1987).
190. Gerke, 123 Ill. 2d at 88-89, 525 N.E.2d at 70. The prosecution filed a nolle
prosequi motion to dismiss the criminal charges against the defendants when the arresting
officer failed to appear to testify on the scheduled court date. Id. at 88, 525 N.E.2d at 70.
191. Id. at 89, 525 N.E.2d at 70.
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defendant's license.1 92 On appeal, the defendant contended that a
one-year summary suspension violates due process because it was
an excessive deprivation of property and did not provide for a
timely review of the suspension. 193
The supreme court, however, rejected the defendant's procedural due process challenge and affirmed the one-year summary
suspension of the defendant's license.1 94 The court relied upon the
reasoning in Esposito,195 and stated that the Esposito holding extends to the one-year summary suspension provision. 96 The court
also held that the statute does not violate due process with respect
to post-suspension review because the statute provides for a summary suspension hearing, in most cases, within three days of the
effective date of the suspension. 97 The court stated that the threeday delay does not seriously impair an individual's due process
rights.1 98 Accordingly, the court affirmed99the appellate court's decision and upheld the contested statute.

Additionally, the Gerke court affirmed the appellate court's
holding that the trial court lacked the discretion to dismiss the defendant's summary suspension based upon the disposition of the
underlying criminal charges.2 0 The court noted that by enacting
the Illinois summary suspension procedures, the legislature intended to create a civil cause of action against drunk drivers independent of the criminal cause of action.20 1 In light of the
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 91, 525 N.E.2d at 71.
195. See supra notes 177-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Esposito
case.
196. Gerke, 123 Ill. 2d at 90, 525 N.E.2d at 71. The court determined that a reexamination of the one-year summary suspension provision in light of the Eldridge test
was not necessary because the Esposito court's analysis of the six-month summary suspension provision applies equally to the one-year summary suspension. Id.
197. Id. at 91-92, 525 N.E.2d at 71.
198. Id. The court did not express an opinion as to how long the post-suspension
hearing could be delayed without violating the licensee's due process rights. Id. at 92,
525 N.E.2d at 71.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 92, 525 N.E.2d at 71-72.
201. Id. at 94, 525 N.E.2d at 72. The court distinguished the Illinois summary suspension law from a Wisconsin summary suspension provision which requires a person to
submit to an alcohol test in order to secure evidence to be used in determining whether
the person is intoxicated. See State v. Brooks, 113 Wis. 2d 347, 348, 335 N.W.2d 354,
354-55 (1983). In contrast to the Wisconsin statute, the Illinois legislature intended the
Illinois summary suspension provisions to provide greater protection to the public by
removing drunk drivers from the road. The summary suspension provision in Illinois,
unlike the Wisconsin statute, is not punitive in nature. Gerke, 123 Ill. 2d at 94-95, 525
N.E.2d at 72-73.
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legislative intent behind the Illinois summary suspension provisions, the court held that the trial court erred in dismissing the
civil prosecution against the defendant based solely upon the disposition of the criminal charges.2 °2
C. Separation of Powers
Unlike the federal constitution, the Illinois Constitution of 1970
expressly provides for the separation of powers among the three
branches of the state government. 20 3 During the Survey year, the

court consistently interpreted the separation of powers doctrine as
not requiring a complete separation of the branches of government
or a rigid compartmentalization of governmental functions. Under
the court's analysis, a violation of the separation of powers clause
occurs when one branch exercises "undue" power properly belonging to another branch or "unduly" burdens another branch in the
exercise of "inherent" powers. 2°
In People v. Inghram,2 °5 the court addressed a separation of
powers challenge to the provision of the Illinois Motor Vehicle
Code20 6 which authorizes the court to issue a judicial driving permit ("JDP") to persons demonstrating a need for such relief. The
defendant in Inghram petitioned the court to obtain a JDP following the summary suspension of her driver's license.20 7 The circuit
court dismissed her petition and held that the JDP provision vio202.

Gerke, 123 Ill. 2d at 95, 525 N.E.2d at 73.
ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1 ("The legislative, executive and judicial branches are
separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another.").
204. But see People v. O'Donnell, 116 Ill. 2d 517, 508 N.E.2d 1066 (1987) (the separation of powers doctrine does not bar one branch of government from exercising powers
conventionally belonging to another branch); City of Waukegan v. Pollution Control Bd.,
57 Ill. 2d 170, 311 N.E.2d 146 (1974) (the separation of powers clause was not intended
to separate completely the three branches of government).
205. 118 Ill. 2d 140, 514 N.E.2d 977 (1987).
206. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 6-206.1 (1987). Section 6-206.1 states in pertinent part:
[T]he driver who is impaired by alcohol or other drugs is a threat to the public
safety and welfare. Therefore.. . to remove problem drivers from the highway,
a statutory summary driver's license suspension is appropriate. It is also recognized that driving is a privilege and that in some cases the granting of limited
driving privileges ... is warranted... in the form of a judicial driving permit to
allow the person to continue employment and drive in connection with other
necessary activities where no alterative means of transportation is available.
Id.
207. Inghram, 118 Ill. 2d at 142, 514 N.E.2d at 978. Defendant's license was summarily suspended pursuant to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 11-501.1 (1987) following
her arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. Inghram, 118 Ill. 2d at 142, 514
N.E.2d at 978.
203.
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State appealed to the supreme court, and the court reversed. 20 9
The court initially noted that, although the separation of powers
doctrine prohibits two branches of government from exercising the
same power,21 0 the doctrine does not entirely prohibit one branch
from performing a function ordinarily exercised by another
branch.2 ' The court reasoned that the judiciary can perform nonjudicial functions as long as these functions neither usurp another
branch's authority nor unduly burden the judiciary in performing
its conventional activities.21 2 The court held that the JDP provision does not usurp the Secretary's power to issue, suspend, or restrict a person's driving privileges. 2 3 The court also held that the
judicial issuance of a JDP does not unduly burden the courts with
a non-judicial function. 214 The court, therefore, upheld section 6-

206.1 as a constitutional delegation of an executive power to the
judicial branch of government. 1 5
In People v. Hamilton,1 6 the court addressed a challenge to the
summary suspension provision of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code
based upon the separation of powers doctrine.21 7 In Hamilton, the
208. Inghram, 118 Ill. 2d at 143, 514 N.E.2d at 978. The circuit court determined
that, in authorizing the courts to issue JDPs, the statute confers upon the courts a power
conventionally exercised by the Secretary of State, thereby violating separation of powers.
Id. at 145, 514 N.E.2d at 980.
209. Id. at 152, 514 N.E.2d at 983.
210. Id. at 146, 514 N.E.2d at 980.
211. Id. at 148, 514 N.E.2d at 981.
212. Id. at 149, 514 N.E.2d at 981.
213. Id. at 150, 514 N.E.2d at 981-82. The court rejected the circuit court's finding
that the JDP provision conflicts with the Secretary of State's power to restrict a person's
driver's license at the time of issuance or to issue a hardship license following revocation
of a driver's license. Id. at 150, 514 N.E.2d at 982. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para.
6-113 (1987) (authorizing the Secretary of State to restrict a person's license); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 6-205 (1987) (authorizing the Secretary of State to issue hardship
licenses following revocation of a driver's license). The supreme court held that the JDP
provision applies at a different point in time from these other provisions of the Illinois
Motor Vehicle Code and, therefore, does not conflict with these other sections. Inghram,
118 Ill. 2d at 152, 514 N.E.2d at 983.
214. Inghram, 118 Ill. 2d at 149, 514 N.E.2d at 981. The court reasoned that according to the plain language of the statute, section 6-206.1 was intended to be an additional
remedy to the problem posed by drunk drivers on the state's roadways. Id. at 149, 514
N.E.2d at 981-82. The court stated that the General Assembly could determine that a
judicial determination of a first-time drunk driver's need for a hardship license was appropriate. Id. at 150, 514 N.E.2d at 982.
215. Id.
216. 118 I11.2d 153, 514 N.E.2d 965 (1987).
217. Id. at 157, 514 N.E.2d at 968. The other issue raised in Hamilton was whether
section 2-118.1(b) violated procedural due process, insofar as it purported to limit the
issues which may be raised at a driver's license summary suspension rescission hearing.
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circuit court held that section 2-118.1 (b) of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code violates separation of powers because it allows a court
to rescind the Secretary of State's summary suspension of a driver's
license.218
On appeal, the supreme court concluded that section 2-118.1 (b)
neither usurps the Secretary of State's power to suspend a driver's
license nor imposes a function upon the judiciary that hinders its
performance of other essential judicial activities. 21 9 The court added that the legislature has the authority to expand or limit the
Secretary's power to issue a summary suspension because the Secretary's power stems from a legislative grant. 22° As long as the

summary suspension provision neither usurps the Secretary's
power to issue or suspend a driver's license nor impairs the conventional activities of the court, the statute does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers. 221 Accordingly, the court held the

summary suspension provision constitutional.222
In People v. Walker,223 the supreme court addressed a separation
of powers challenge to a provision for the automatic substitution of
judges in the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure. 224 The defend-

ant in Walker petitioned the court for a substitute judge because
she believed that the assigned judge was prejudiced against her.
The State filed a countermotion and contended that section 1145(a) violates separation of powers by unlawfully infringing upon
the administrative authority of the judiciary.225 In particular, the
For a discussion of the due process challenge, see supra notes 166-76 and accompanying
text.
218. Id. at 161-62, 514 N.E.2d at 969-70 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 2118.1 (1987)).
219. Id. at 162, 514 N.E.2d at 970. See People v. O'Donnell, 116 Ill. 2d 517, 508
N.E.2d 1066 (1987), wherein the court sustained section 6-208.1(c) of the Illinois Motor
Vehicle Code which authorizes the judiciary to collect fees for the issuance or re-instatement of a person's driving privileges. The O'Donnell court reasoned that because the
collection of reinstatement fees is a ministerial, non-discretionary task, the court's performance of this task does not violate separation of powers. Id. at 528, 508 N.E.2d at
1071.
220. Hamilton, 118 Ill. 2d at 162, 514 N.E.2d at 970.
221. Id. Cf. People v. Inghram, 118 Ill. 2d 140, 514 N.E.2d 9776 (1987) (the court's
power to issue judicial driving permits does not violate separation of powers because it
neither usurps the Secretary of State's power to suspend driver's licenses nor unduly burdens the judiciary with a non-judicial function).
222. Hamilton, 118 Ill. 2d at 162, 514 N.E.2d at 970.
223. 119 Ill. 2d 465, 519 N.E.2d 890 (1988).
224. Id. at 473-74, 519 N.E.2d at 892. The automatic substitution of judges provision
permits a person to petition the court for a substitution of the assigned judge on the
grounds of personal bias or prejudice of the judge. Upon filing the petition, the case
automatically transfers to another judge. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 114-5(a) (1987).
225. Walker, 119 Ill. 2d at 472, 519 N.E.2d at 891-92.
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State argued that the provision for the automatic226substitution 22of a
and 63(c). 1
judge conflicts with Supreme Court Rules 21(b)
In reversing the circuit court, the supreme court examined those
Illinois Supreme Court Rules which allegedly conflicted with the
provision for the automatic substitution of a judge.228 The court
found that the automatic substitution of judges provision does not
conflict with the judicial authority over assignment of judges because the substitution of judges provision does not come into effect
until after the initial assignment of a judge has been made. 229 The
court also found that the provision for the automatic substitution
of a judge does not conflict with Rule 63(c) because nothing in
section 114-5 stops a judge from self-disqualification when the defendant challenges that judge's impartiality. 230 Thus, based upon
the plain terms of the statute, section 114-5(a) does not violate separation of powers.231
Justices Ward, Miller, and Simon concurred with the majority's
decision; 232 yet, they stated that the court erred in establishing a
good faith requirement for a litigant's petition for substitution of
226. Id. at 475, 519 N.E.2d at 893. Rule 21(b) provides in pertinent part: "The chief
judge of each circuit may enter general orders in the exercise of his general administrative
authority, including orders providing for assignment ofjudges ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
1 10A, para. 21(b) (1987). The State argued that the automatic substitution of judges
provision interfered with the chief judge's power of assignment as authorized by Rule
21(b). Walker, 119 Ill. 2d at 475, 519 N.E.2d at 893.
227. Walker, 119 Ill. 2d at 477, 519 N.E.2d at 894. Rule 63(C)(1)(a) provides for the
self-disqualification of a judge who has reason to question his impartiality as a result of
either an affiliation with a particular attorney or party, or a potential bias concerning a
particular attorney or party. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 63(C)(1)(a)(1987).
228. Walker, 119 Ill. 2d at 475-76, 519 N.E.2d at 893-94. The court initially noted
that the legislature has constitutional authority to enact procedural rules for the court in
order to facilitate the exercise of judicial power and to complement the procedural rules
promulgated by the court itself. Id. at 475, 519 N.E.2d at 893. The legislature, however,
may not enact statutes concerned solely with the administration of the daily activities of
the courts. Id. The court also stated that if a conflict exists between a legislative and
judicial rule of court, and the legislative rule is based upon an important policy consideration, then the court reconciles the conflict between the two rules. If a conflict exists, and
no policy consideration justifies the legislative rule, then the court rule prevails. Id.
229. Id. at 477, 519 N.E.2d at 894.
230. Id. at 478-79, 519 N.E.2d at 894.
231. Id. at 482, 519 N.E.2d at 896-97. In addition to its resolution of the separation
of powers challenge in terms of statutory analysis, the Walker court also recognized that
the automatic substitution of judges statute protects a litigant's constitutional right to a
fair trial before an unbiased judge. Id. at 478, 519 N.E.2d at 894-95. The history of prior
statutes and the case law supporting similar statutes, also support the court's conclusion
that the automatic substitution of judges provision secures litigants with a fair and impartial trial. Id. at 480-81, 519 N.E.2d at 895-96. Lastly, the court noted that the automatic
substitution of judges provision is subject to a good faith requirement and cannot be used
as a delay tactic. Id. at 482, 519 N.E.2d at 896.
232. Id. at 482-85, 519 N.E.2d at 897-98 (Miller, J., concurring).

1989]

Constitutional Law

the assigned judge.2 33 The justices found no "good faith" requirement within the language of the statute and noted that the statute
requires only a showing of good cause for the substitution of a
judge on the grounds of prejudice. 234 The justices stated that in
establishing a "good faith" requirement, the majority overstepped
its discretion and read into the statute something which the plain
language of the statute does not indicate.235
In People v. Porter,2 36 the court rejected a separation of powers
challenge 237 to section 122-2.1 of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure. 238 The defendants contended that section 122-2.1 conflicts
with Supreme Court Rule 651(c), which prescribes the procedure
for appointment of counsel for indigent petitioners on appeal.239
The supreme court rejected the defendants arguments and held
that section 122-2.1 does not conflict with Supreme Court Rule
651(c) and, therefore, does not violate the separation of powers
doctrine. 2 °
In reaching its decision, the court noted that the appointment of
counsel procedure under section 122-2.1 occurs at a different stage
of the post-conviction process from the appointment of counsel
procedure authorized under Supreme Court Rule 65 1(c). 241 Sec-

tion 122-2.1 affects the post-conviction petitioner's right to counsel
at the trial level; on the other hand, Rule 651(c) affects a post233. Id. at 483, 519 N.E.2d at 897 (Miller, J., concurring).
234. Id. at 484, 519 N.E.2d at 897 (Miller, J., concurring).
235. Id. (Miller, J., concurring). Justices Miller and Simon also opined that, contrary
to the majority's opinion, the automatic substitution of judges provision has no constitutional basis. Id. at 484-85, 519 N.E.2d at 898 (Miller, J., concurring). The relevant consideration in analyzing section 114-5, Justice Miller wrote, is "the longevity of the
practice under attack." Id. at 485, 519 N.E.2d at 898 (Miller, J., concurring). Like the
majority, Miller recognized the historical precedent of the automatic substitution of
judges statute and believed that this history provided adequate justification for the statute. Id. (Miller, J., concurring).
236. 122 Ill. 2d 64, 521 N.E.2d 1158 (1988).
237. Id. at 73, 521 N.E.2d at 1160-61. The defendants in Porter also contested the
validity of section 122-2.1 in terms of procedural due process. See supra notes 148-64 and
accompanying text. See note 150 for the supreme court's disposition of the defendants'
additional equal protection challenge.
238. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d at 73, 521 N.E.2d at 1161. Section 122-2.1 allows the trial
court to dismiss a post-conviction petition for retrial prior to the appointment of counsel
on behalf of the petitioner. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-2.1(a) (1987).
239. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d at 72, 521 N.E.2d at 1160. Rule 651(c) states in pertinent
part: "Upon timely filing of a notice of appeal in a post-conviction proceeding, if the trial
court determines that the petitioner is indigent, it... shall appoint counsel on appeal ...
without cost to the petitioner." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 65 1(c) (1987).
240. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d at 73, 521 N.E.2d at 1161.
241. Id. at 72, 521 N.E.2d at 1160.
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conviction petitioner's right to counsel at the appellate level.242 In
light of this distinction, the court concluded that section 122-2.1
and Rule 651(c) do not conflict with each other.243
Furthermore, the court ruled that appointment of counsel at the
hearing stage of the post-conviction proceeding is a legislative matter. 2 "4 The Porter court held that as long as the legislative enactment concerning the appointment of counsel in post-conviction
proceedings does not conflict with the inherent powers of the judiciary, the law does not violate separation of powers.245 The court
concluded that section 122-2.1 does not conflict with any inherent
judicial power and, therefore, does not violate the separation of
powers doctrine.246
Justice Simon dissented from the majority's decision and found
the majority's interpretation of the relation between section 122-2.1
and Rule 651(c) anomalous.24 7 Simon noted that the majority distinguished section 122-2.1 from Rule 651(c) on the basis of the
time at which the petition for retrial was made.248 If the petition
was filed before an appeal was taken, then the petitioner has no
242. Id.
243. Id. at 73, 521 N.E.2d at 1161.
244. Id. at 72-73, 521 N.E.2d at 1160-61. in People v. Ward, 124 111. App. 3d 974,
978, 464 N.E.2d 1144, 1147 (4th Dist. 1984), the court stated that "the right to counsel at
post-conviction proceedings is a matter of legislative grace and favor which may be altered by the legislature at will."
245. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d at 73, 521 N.E.2d at 1161.
246. Id. The court also affirmed the validity of section 122-2.1 despite the fact that
the court had previously held unconstitutional section 122-8 of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure. See People v. Joseph, 113 Ill. 2d 36, 495 N.E.2d 501 (1986). Section 1228 required a different judge to hear a post-conviction petition than the original trial judge.
The court reasoned that section 122-2.1 is severable from section 122-8 and can be enforced independently. Porter, 122 Il. 2d at 80, 521 N.E.2d at 1163. Also, the court
found that nothing in the legislative history of section 122-2.1 indicates that section 1222.1 would not have been passed but for the inclusion of section 122-8. Id. at 80-81, 521
N.E.2d at 1164. The court therefore concluded that the invalidity of section 122-8 does
not likewise invalidate section 122-2.1. Id. at 81, 521 N.E.2d at 1165. Lastly, the court
held that the circuit court did not err in failing to file a written order dismissing the
petitioners' post-conviction petition, but did err in failing to enter its dismissal order
within 30 days of the filing of its petition. Id. at 83-85, 521 N.E.2d at 1165-67. In reaching this conclusion, the court determined that the word "shall" as it appears in the statute
is directory in regards to the writing requirement and mandatory with respect to the 30day requirement. Id. The court reasoned that the word "shall" meant that the court did
not necessarily have to issue a written order but it did have to issue an order within 30
days. Given this distinction, the circuit court's failure to file a written order did not
impair the validity of the dismissal order; but, the court's failure to file this order within
30 days did invalidate the order. Id. at 85, 521 N.E.2d at 1167.
247. Id. at 92, 521 N.E.2d at 1170 (Simon, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 93, 521 N.E.2d at 1170 (Simon, J., dissenting).
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constitutional right to counsel.2 49 If, however, the petitioner filed
for retrial after filing an appeal, then the petitioner has the right to
have counsel appointed.25 ° In making this distinction, Simon felt
that the court inexplicably and unnecessarily shifted the focus of
meaningful post-conviction representation from the trial court to
the appellate court. 25 ' He also criticized the court's discussion of

the difference between legislative acts that preempted a judicial
prerogative and those that addressed merely a peripheral aspect of
judicial administration.252 Simon stated that the court inappropriately relied upon an appellate court decision for the proposition
that the appointment of counsel is a legislative matter.253 Simon
argued that the majority again failed to establish a definitive line
between the essential and peripheral function of the judiciary.254
The court's reluctance to invalidate legislation as violative of the
separation of powers doctrine was evident throughout the Survey
year. The court consistently rejected every separation of powers
challenge presented. In rejecting these challenges, the court often
focused upon the point at which the contested statutes became effective. 255 The court, however, failed to articulate any analysis that
would inform litigants as to how the court determines which powers are inherent or essential and which are merely peripheral. It
was the ad hoc process of categorization that led to Justice Simon's
well-founded charge that the court forced litigants to play a "shell
game" when bringing a separation of powers challenge.256
249. Id. (Simon, J., dissenting).
250. Id. (Simon, J., dissenting).
251. Id. (Simon, J., dissenting).
252. Id. (Simon, J., dissenting). In his dissent in People v. Joseph, 113 Ill. 2d 36, 495
N.E.2d 501 (1986), Justice Simon fully discussed the perceived difference between legislation which preempted a "fundamentally judicial prerogative" and legislation which has
only a "peripheral effect on judicial administration." Id. at 50, 495 N.E.2d at 508 (Simon, J., dissenting).
253. Porter, 122 111. 2d at 93-94, 521 N.E.2d at 1170 (Simon, J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 94, 521 N.E.2d at 1171 (Simon, J., dissenting). Justice Simon also stated
that the majority's use of the word "shall" in its interpretation of the statute was
"chameleonic" in that the majority used the word to mean "mandatory" in one situation
and simply "directory" in another. Id. (Simon, J., dissenting). The statute states:
Within thirty days after filing ... of each petition, the court shall examine such
petition and enter an order ....

If the court determines the petition is frivo-

lous or is patently without merit, it shall dismiss the petition in a written order,
specifying the findings of fact and conclusions of law it made in reaching it
decision.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-2.1 (1987). Given the language of the statute, Justice
Simon's criticism of the majority's reading of the word "shall" is well-founded.
255. See, e.g., People v. Walker, 119 Ill. 2d 465, 519 N.E.2d 890 (1988) (the contested
provision applied at a point in time distinct from the allegedly conflicting provisions).
256. Joseph, 113 Ill. 2d at 58, 495 N.E.2d at 512 (Simon, J., dissenting). Justice Si-
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D. Bill of Rights
Several cases during the Survey year challenged a particular Illinois statute as violative of the protection accorded to individuals
under the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution. In
People v. Baker,257 for example, the defendant argued that the presentence professional evaluation violated his fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination.2 8 The trial court ordered the defendant
to submit to a presentence professional evaluation following his
conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol. 2 9 The defendant, however, refused to submit to the professional evaluation,
claiming that the fifth amendment guaranteed his right against selfincrimination. 26 The trial court issued a contempt order against
the defendant, and he appealed. 26 ' The appellate court held that
the fifth amendment applied to the pre-sentence evaluation and
that the defendant was not required to answer the question
presented in the evaluation. 262 The State appealed to the supreme
court. On appeal, the court considered whether the fifth amendment applies to the pre-sentence evaluation, and whether a defendant can use its protection to avoid answering
the questions raised
263
during the course of the evaluation.
To resolve this issue, the court considered the nature of both the
sentencing phase of trial and the fifth amendment. 26 1 The court
first determined that the professional evaluation was not
mandatory in this case because the sentencing court could have
appropriately determined the defendant's fine and sentence without
the pre-sentence evaluation. 265 The abstract of the defendant's
mon stated that the majority's "decision leaves future decisionmakers to chart an unsurveyed course and [they will] likely wander in the wilderness of our separation of powers
jurisprudence." Id. at 58-59, 495 N.E.2d at 512 (Simon, J., dissenting).
257. 123 I11.2d 233, 526 N.E.2d 157 (1988).
258. Id. at 235, 526 N.E.2d at 159. Illinois law requires a defendant to undergo a
professional evaluation prior to sentencing so as to determine whether the defendant has
an alcohol or drug problem or any other mental or physical problems which require
special treatment. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 11-501(e) (1985), recodified at ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 11-501(f) (1987). The Uniform Code of Corrections also
requires a pre-sentence evaluation. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-4-1(a) (1987).
259. Baker, 123 I11.2d at 235, 526 N.E.2d at 159.
260. Id. at 238, 526 N.E.2d at 160. The defendant argued that the questions asked
during the course of the professional evaluation would force him to reveal information
which could potentially result in the imposition of a more severe sentence upon him. Id.
at 238-39, 526 N.E.2d at 160-61.
261. Id. at 235, 526 N.E.2d at 159.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 236, 526 N.E.2d at 159.
265. Id. at 237-38, 526 N.E.2d at 160.
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driving and criminal record sufficiently indicated whether the defendant had a recurrent problem of driving under the influence of
alcohol or whether mitigating factors existed.266 Although the professional evaluation would have provided additional information
regarding the defendant's potential for rehabilitation, the court
concluded that the evaluation was not necessary for a determination of the appropriate sentence for the defendant.267
The court next considered whether the fifth amendment applies
to professional evaluations.26 s The court reasoned that because the
professional evaluation generally occurs in an uncoerced, voluntary setting, and is directed only towards determining the defendant's mental and physical state, the fifth amendment is not selfactivating with respect to such evaluations.2 69 Thus, in order to
claim the protection of the fifth amendment, the defendant must
invoke its protection during the course of the professional evaluation and at the time the questions are asked.27° The court also held
that the defendant must timely raise any objections to the questions and must base his objections upon a reasonable fear that the
questions, if answered, will reveal incriminating information.'
The court thus reversed the appellate court and remanded the
cause for sentencing, providing directions for processing any subsequent fifth amendment claim raised by the defendant.7
Prior to the court's decision in Baker, the Illinois courts had not
established a definitive procedure for resolving a person's attempt
to invoke the fifth amendment during the course of a pre-sentencing evaluation. The Baker court's thorough analysis of both the
sentencing phase of trial and the nature of the fifth amendment
266. Id. at 241-42, 526 N.E.2d at 162. This information was already before the court
as part of the record. Id.
267. Id. at 242, 526 N.E.2d at 162. The court stated that a pre-sentence evaluation is
ordinarily used to reduce a sentence. The court usually imposes the maximum penalty
and then reduces the sentence based upon the evaluation's results. Thus, the court concluded, the defendant's fear that the evaluation would lead to a more severe sentence was
without merit. Id. at 241-42, 526 N.E.2d at 162.
268. Id. at 242, 526 N.E.2d at 162.
269. Id. at 243, 526 N.E.2d at 162-63. In Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984),
the United States Supreme Court held that the protection of the fifth amendment is selfactivating only in those situations where the individual is forced to disclose incriminating
information involuntarily or within a custodial setting. In all other situations, the individual must invoke the protection of the fifth amendment upon timely objection. Id. at
425.
270. Baker, 123 Ill. 2d at 243, 526 N.E.2d at 163.
271. Id. at 243-44, 526 N.E.2d at 163. The supreme court held that the trial court
will then determine the reasonableness of the defendant's fear and compel disclosure
where appropriate. Id. at 244, 526 N.E.2d at 163.
272. Id. at 245, 526 N.E.2d at 163-64.
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provides future decisionmakers with the appropriate method with
which to address any subsequent fifth amendment challenges.
It is never made clear in the court's opinion, however, what outcome the defendant is seeking to avoid by invoking the fifth
amendment. The defendant could be seeking to avoid further prosecutions for drunk driving based on an admission made during the
evaluation or a harsher sentence for the instant conviction based
on aggravating circumstances revealed at the evaluation. Particular language in the court's opinion indicates that the court considered the assertion of the fifth amendment privilege under the latter
circumstances. The court stated that the defendant's argument
lacked merit because the court had sufficient information without
the evaluation to justify imposing the maximum sentence. 3
Therefore, any information revealed during the evaluation could
only serve to mitigate the sentence.274
A decision that the fifth amendment could properly be asserted
to protect against a harsher sentence would greatly expand upon
the guarantees of the fifth amendment. There appear to be no decisions dealing with the analogous situation of invoking the fifth
amendment privilege when answers might lead to the revocation of
parole or probation. Nor do there appear to be any decisions dealing with the assertion of the fifth amendment strictly to protect a
defendant in the sentencing phase of a trial.
In People v. Geever,2 7 5 the court rejected the defendants' first
amendment challenge to section 11-20.1 of the Illinois Criminal
Code of 1969 which prohibits the possession of child pornography.276 The defendants in Geever were charged with violating section 11-20.1 after home searches revealed evidence of child
pornography.277 The trial court dismissed the State's complaint on
the grounds that section 11-20.1 violates the defendants' first
amendment rights. 278 The State appealed directly to the supreme
273. Id. at 242, 526 N.E.2d at 162.
274. Id.
275. 122 Il1. 2d 313, 522 N.E.2d 1200 (1987).
276. Id. at 330, 522 N.E.2d at 1208. Paragraph 11-20.1 of the Criminal Code states
in pertinent part:
[The offense of child pornography occurs when] with knowledge of the nature
or content thereof, [a person] reproduces, disseminates . . . or possesses any
film, videotape, photograph or other similar visual reproduction of any child...
under the age of 18 engaged in any activity described in subparagraphs (i)
through (vii) of paragraph (1) of this subsection ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-20.1 (1987).
277. Geever, 122 Ill. 2d at 315, 522 N.E.2d at 1201.
278. Id.
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court, and the court reversed the circuit court's decision.2 79
In assessing the constitutionality of the child pornography law,
the court reviewed a decision of the United States Supreme Court
wherein the Court held unconstitutional a Georgia state law that
prohibited the possession of pornographic materials in an individual's home. 280 The court also noted, however, the more recent

Supreme Court decision in New York v. Ferber28 ' wherein the
Court upheld a New York state law prohibiting the dissemination
of child pornography.282 In sustaining the New York law, the Ferber Court reasoned that the overwhelming public interest in the
health and welfare of children justifies any alleged compromise of
an individual's first amendment right to possess child
pornography.2 s3
The court in Geever adopted the Ferber Court's reasoning and
ruled that society's need to preserve the welfare of children justifies
the extension of the proscription against the possession of child
pornography in an individual's home. 2s4 The court recognized that

although the Constitution protects the privacy of an individual's
home, the protection is not without limitation.2 5 Compelling reasons may override an individual's right to possess certain objectionable materials.28 6 Society's compelling interest in protecting
279. Id. at 330, 522 N.E.2d at 1208.
280. Id. at 317, 522 N.E.2d at 1202. Under Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-65
(1969), any statute prohibiting the possession of pornographic materials in an individual's
home violated the first and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution. The Court stated
that although the state had the power to regulate obscenity, the state did not have the
power to extend that regulation into the privacy of an individual's home. Id. at 568.
281. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
282. Id. at 765-66. In Ferber, the Supreme Court discussed at length the evils of child
pornography and the need for legislation to protect children from these evils. Id. at 758
n.9.
283. Id. at 764. The Court stated that the prevention of child pornography safeguards the physiological and psychological well-being of the child. Id. at 756-57. Given
the severe and permanent damage which child pornography may cause, the Court concluded that the state is justified in regulating the dissemination of child pornography. Id.
at 764.
284. Geever, 122 Ill. 2d at 327, 522 N.E.2d at 1206-07. The court also noted that the
express purpose of the Illinois child pornography law was to prevent the sexual abuse and
exploitation of children. Id. at 324, 522 N.E.2d at 1205. To achieve this goal, the legislature prohibited the production, dissemination, and possession of child pornography. Id.
The proscription of possession, in particular, was aimed at "drying up" the child pornography market, thereby eliminating the demand for child pornography. Id. at 326, 522
N.E.2d at 1206. The legislature conceived the prohibition of possession as a vital link in
the complete eradication of child pornography. Id.
285. Id. at 325, 522 N.E.2d at 1205.
286. Id. (quoting Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568 n. 11).
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children from the evils of child pornography,287 the court reasoned,
justifies the state's limitation on the first amendment rights of an
individual. 28 The court, therefore, upheld section 11-20.1's prohibition of the possession of child pornography.289
Justice Clark dissented from the majority's opinion and stated
that in extending the proscription against the possession of child
pornography into private homes, the legislature compromised the
first amendment rights of an individual.2 " Clark recognized the
serious threat that child pornography poses to the safety of children, but believed that even this public interest does not justify the
overthrow of the fundamental right of free expression.29 ' Clark
also stated that the majority failed to consider adequately the defendants' challenge to the validity of the statute in light of the right
to privacy clause of the Illinois Constitution.292 Clark argued that
the protection of an individual's right to privacy under the Illinois
Constitution exceeds the protection provided under the United
States Constitution.293 Although Clark conceded that section 1120.1 may be constitutional in light of the first amendment, he
maintained that section 11-20.1 violates the individual's right to
287.

See Shouvlin, Preventing the Sexual Exploitation of Children:A Model Act, 17
L. REV. 535 (1981) (discussing the evils of child pornography).
288. Geever, 122 Ill. 2d at 327, 522 N.E.2d at 1206-07.
289. Id. at 327, 522 N.E.2d at 1207. The court found additional support from decisions in other jurisdictions that affirmed the validity of statutes similar to section 11-20.1.
See, e.g., State v. Meadows, 28 Ohio St. 3d 43, 503 N.E.2d 697 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 1581 (1987); see also United States v. Anderson, 803 F.2d 903 (7th Cir. 1986). The
court also cited several penal codes which contain proscriptions against the possession of
child pornography. See Geever, 122 Ill. 2d at 329, 522 N.E.2d at 1207.
290. Id. at 331, 522 N.E.2d at 1208 (Clark, J., dissenting).
291. Id. (Clark, J., dissenting).
292. Id. at 337, 522 N.E.2d at 1211 (Clark, J., dissenting). In People v. Tisler, 103
Ill. 2d 226, 241-42, 469 N.E.2d 147, 155 (1984), the court held that the search and seizure
provision of the Illinois Constitution should be construed similarly to the federal interpretation of the fourth amendment. The Tisler court recognized, however, that the Illinois Constitution protects an individual's right of privacy. Id. at 242, 469 N.E.2d at 155.
In a special concurrence, Justice Clark suggested that because of this express protection
of a right of privacy, the Illinois courts should not "march in lockstep" with federal
interpretations of federal constitutional principles, even when the Illinois Constitution is
worded similarly. Id. at 258, 469 N.E.2d at 163 (Clark, J., specially concurring).
In his dissent in Geever, Justice Clark relied upon the arguments raised in his Tisler
concurrence and applied those arguments to the right of privacy. Clark urged that the
court not "march in lockstep" with the federal court's interpretation of the first amendment and thereby discard the Illinois Constitution's express guarantee of the right of
privacy. Geever, 122 Ill. 2d at 341, 522 N.E.2d at 1213 (Clark, J., dissenting).
293. Id. at 341-42, 522 N.E.2d at 1213-14 (Clark, J., dissenting). Justice Clark's dissent here echoes the argument raised by Justice Simon in his dissent to People v. Porter,
122 111. 2d 64, 521 N.E.2d 1158 (1988), supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
WAKE FOREST
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privacy guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution.294
By failing to undertake a serious analysis of the defendant's
claim under the privacy clause of the Illinois Constitution, a majority of the court continued to demonstrate a reluctance to explore
the use of the state constitution to expand personal freedoms beyond the standards required by the Bill of Rights. 29 Although it is
not surprising that the court declined to find protection for child
pornography within the privacy clause, the court's apparent unwillingness to consider the applicability of the Illinois privacy
clause as a protection of the defendants' claimed fundamental
rights is significant. The Geever case indicates that litigants relying
solely on the Illinois Constitution to protect fundamental rights
must drag a reluctant court into previously uncharted waters.
The overwhelming public interest that justified the limitation of
an individual's first amendment right in Geever, also applies in a
variety of other contexts. For example, in People v. Kohrig,29 6 the
court held that the overwhelming public interest in protecting Illinois motorists from the dangers of automobile accidents justifies
the intrusion upon an individual's right to privacy posed by the
Illinois Seat Belt Law. 297 The supreme court stated that the legislature may limit an individual's right to privacy when a compelling
state interest necessitates such limitation. 298 The state's interest in
protecting its citizens from serious injuries resulting from automo299
bile accidents necessitates the requirements of the Seat Belt Law.
The court also noted that the state has the power to enact legislation that promotes the general economic welfare of the state. 3 °
294. Geever, 122 Ill. 2d at 342, 522 N.E.2d at 1213-14 (Clark, J., dissenting).
295. See People v. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d 64, 521 N.E.2d 1158 (1988) (Simon, J., dissenting). In Porter, Justice Simon dissented from the majority opinion and argued for the
expansion of due process protection under the Illinois Constitution beyond the limits of
federal interpretations of due process. Id. at 88, 521 N.E.2d at 1167-68 (Simon, J.,
dissenting).
296. 113 Ill. 2d 384, 498 N.E.2d 1158 (1986).
297. Id. at 396, 498 N.E.2d at 1162 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 12-603

(1985)).
298. Id. at 393, 498 N.E.2d at 1160.
299. Id. at 405, 498 N.E.2d at 1166. The Kohrig court overturned the decision in
People v. Fries, 42 Ill. 2d 446, 250 N.E.2d 149 (1969), wherein the court previously held
unconstitutional the Illinois Motorcyclists Helmet Law, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2,
para. 189c(a) (1967). The court, in Fries, held that the helmet law violated an individual's right to privacy and unlawfully extended the police power of the state. Fries,42 I11.
2d at 450, 250 N.E.2d at 151. The Kohrig court declared that to the extent that Fries was
inconsistent with the decision in Kohrig, Fries was overruled. Kohrig, 113 Ill. 2d at 406,
498 N.E.2d at 1166.

300. Kohrig, 113 Ill. 2d at 404, 498 N.E.2d at 1166. The Kohrig court also stated that
the fact that a statute reflects an unprovable assumption about what is good for the peo-
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The court reasoned that the Seat Belt Law reduces the private and
public costs arising from injuries and deaths caused by automobile
accidents, thereby promoting the general welfare of the state. 30 '
The court concluded that the law is a constitutional exercise of the
police power of the state and does not violate the first amendment
because the Seat Belt Law would reduce both the 3number
and the
02
cost of injuries arising from automobile accidents.
The court's decision potentially may impact upon future challenges to the constitutionality of the recently enacted mandatory
insurance law in Illinois.3 °3 If the state has the power to enact legislation aimed at reducing private and public costs arising from
injuries and deaths caused by motor vehicles, then the state presumably would have the authority to require each individual to
obtain automobile liability insurance as an incident of ownership of
a motor vehicle. Whether the state's police power does, in fact,
extend this far has yet to be determined.
In County of Cook v. Renaissance Arcade and Bookstore,3° the
court addressed a first amendment challenge to the Cook County
Zoning Ordinance ("the 1981 Ordinance") which restricts the location of sexually explicit businesses to industrially-zoned areas
and certain commercially-zoned areas.30 5 Cook County ("the
County") initially filed a complaint against the defendants as owners of sexually explicit businesses within the county, seeking to enjoin them from operating their businesses outside the areas
designated by the 1981 Ordinance. 3°6 The circuit court ruled in
favor of the County and issued an injunction against the defendpie does not warrant invalidation of the statute on constitutional grounds. Id. at 402, 498
N.E.2d at 1165.
301. Id. at 404, 498 N.E.2d at 1166.
302. Id. at 393, 498 N.E.2d at 1160.
303. See 1988 Ill. Legis. Serv. 85-1201 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
95 1/2, para. 7-601 (1989)).
304. 122 Ill. 2d 123, 522 N.E.2d 73 (1988) [hereinafter Renaissance Arcade].
305. Id. at 131, 522 N.E.2d at 76. See COOK COUNTY ZONING ORDINANCE § 13.161 (1981).
306. Renaissance Arcade, 122 Ill. 2d at 128-29, 522 N.E.2d at 75. The 1981 Ordinance amended the 1977 Ordinance, portions of which were held unconstitutional in
County of Cook v. World Wide News Agency, 98 Ill. App. 3d 1094, 424 N.E.2d 1173
(1st Dist. 1981). The 1981 Ordinance limited the location of sexually explicit businesses,
e.g., adult book stores, to industrially-zoned areas or certain commercially-zoned areas
scattered throughout the county. The 1981 Ordinance also prohibited any two adult use
stores from locating within 1000 feet of each other. The 1981 Ordinance applied to existing businesses and provided a six-month amortization period in which these established
businesses could relocate. The business could obtain upon application a six-month extension to the period. Lastly, the 1981 Ordinance required the owners of the adult use businesses to obtain a special use permit from the Cook County Board of Commissioners
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ants. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial court's order
and held that the 1981 Ordinance unlawfully restricted the public's
access to adult use stores. 30 7 The appellate court further stated
that the 1981 Ordinance failed to provide the defendants with a
reasonable opportunity to operate their businesses because it unfairly limited the location in which the businesses could operate
and impaired public access to communications protected by the
first amendment.3 °8
The supreme court reversed the appellate court's decision and
upheld the 1981 Ordinance. 3 9 The supreme court closely examined the evidence presented to the trial court concerning possible locations within Cook County for the defendants' businesses.
Both parties provided detailed maps and surveys indicating the areas in which the defendants could locate and the amount of available property within these areas. 310 Based upon this evidence, the
court found that the 1981 Ordinance identifies seventy-eight industrially-zoned areas in which the defendants could locate their businesses. 3 1 In addition, the ordinance allows adult use businesses in
another 245 commercially-zoned areas, provided that the businesses held a special use permit. The court concluded that these
industrial areas provide sufficient opportunity for the defendants to
operate their businesses.31 2 The court reasoned that because the
prior to opening an adult use store. Renaissance Arcade, 122 Ill. 2d at 129-30, 522
N.E.2d at 75.
307. Renaissance Arcade, 122 Ill. 2d at 130-31, 522 N.E.2d at 75-76.
308. Id. The appellate court held that the 1981 Ordinance failed to meet the requirements established in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). County of
Cook v. Renaissance Arcade and Bookstore, 150 Ill. App. 3d 6, 15, 501 N.E.2d 133, 139
(1st Dist. 1986). In Renton, the Court stated that a municipal ordinance could regulate
adult use stores provided the ordinance "[did] not unreasonably limit alternative avenues
of communication." Renton, 475 U.S. at 47. The appellate court in RenaissanceArcade
reasoned that the limitations imposed by the 1981 Ordinance unreasonably limited the
public's access to the first amendment protected communications offered by the defendants. Accordingly, the appellate court held the 1981 Ordinance unconstitutional. Renaissance Arcade, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 20-21, 501 N.E.2d at 142-43.
309. Renaissance Arcade, 122 Ill. 2d at 153, 522 N.E.2d at 86.
310. Id. at 134-35, 522 N.E.2d at 77-78. The expert witness for the adult use business
owners showed that the areas in Cook County left available for the defendants' use comprised only 5.7% of the available land within the county. In contrast, the County's expert witness demonstrated -that the ordinance left 8.9% of the total land area of Cook
County available for the defendants' use. Id. at 134, 522 N.E.2d at 77.
311. Id. at 137-38, 522 N.E.2d at 79.
312. Id. at 139-40, 522 N.E.2d at 79-80. According to the Supreme Court's decision
in Renton, a zoning ordinance restricting the operation of adult businesses must provide
the owners a reasonable opportunity to operate their businesses in the city. Renton, 475
U.S. at 54. The ordinance upheld by the Renton Court left 5% of the entire land areas of
the city available for use by the adult business owners. In comparison, the Renaissance
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1981 Ordinance provides the defendants with a reasonable number
of sites in which to operate their businesses, the ordinance neither
unreasonably restricted the defendants' right to operate their businesses nor limited public access to materials protected by the first
amendment.313
The Renaissance Arcade court also addressed several other first
amendment challenges presented by the defendants.31 4 The court
rejected most of these challenges through statutory analysis and
did not rely upon the first amendment for its decision. For example, the defendants contended that because the 1981 Ordinance applies to existing businesses, the ordinance has to contain a
grandfather clause to allow existing adult use businesses that do
not conform to the 1981 Ordinance to continue operation. 315 Because the 1981 Ordinance does not provide a grandfather clause,
the defendants argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional. The
County argued that the lack of a grandfather clause does not make
the ordinance per se unconstitutional; it asserted that the ordinance's amortization period allows ample opportunity for nonconforming adult uses to relocate their businesses in conformity with
the 1981 Ordinance.3 16 Upon careful analysis of the ordinance, the
court concluded that the ordinance is not unconstitutional despite
the lack of a grandfather clause.317 The court found that the sixmonth amortization period provided under the ordinance could be
extended by an additional six months upon application.31 8 Thus, a
nonconforming business has a one-year period in which to relocate
Arcade court found that the Cook County zoning ordinance left between 5.7% and 8.9%
of the total land areas of Cook County available for the defendants' use. The Illinois
Supreme Court, therefore, concluded that the 1981 Ordinance provides the defendants
with a reasonable opportunity to operate their adult businesses within Cook County.
RenaissanceArcade, 122 Ill. 2d at 139-40, 522 N.E.2d at 79-80.
313. RenaissanceArcade, 122 Ill. 2d at 139-40, 522 N.E.2d at 79-80. The court rejected the defendants' objection that no commercially viable areas were readily available
for adult use businesses. Id. at 139, 522 N.E.2d at 79. The court stated, "Renton does
not require the county to provide the defendants with land tailor-made to conform to
[their] requirements." Id. According to Renton, "[the defendants] must fend for themselves in the real estate market, on an equal footing with other prospective purchasers and
lessees." Renton, 475 U.S. at 54.
314. RenaissanceArcade, 122 I11.2d at 140-56, 522 N.E.2d at 80-86.
315. Id. at 140, 522 N.E.2d at 80.
316. Id. The defendants argued that the ordinance's six-month amortization period
is unreasonably short. Id. at 140-41, 522 N.E.2d at 80.
317. Id. at 141, 522 N.E.2d at 80.
318. Id. at 142, 522 N.E.2d at 81. The 1981 COOK COUNTY ZONING ORDINANCE,
§§ 13.16-4-1 to 13.16-4-3 (1981), allows existing businesses to obtain a six-month extension to the amortization period upon application to the Department of Building and Zoning. Renaissance Arcade, 122 Ill. 2d at 141, 522 N.E.2d at 80.
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in conformity with the 1981 Ordinance. The court reasoned that
the one-year period compensates for the ordinance's lack of a
grandfather clause and, therefore, concluded that the ordinance
was not unconstitutional. a 9
The defendants also argued that the spacing requirements of the
1977 Ordinance still apply under the 1981 Ordinance because the
court never invalidated these spacing requirements, despite the fact
that it invalidated most of the other provisions of the 1977 Ordinance.32 ° The defendants contended that these spacing requirements further restricted the number of areas available for their
businesses and that the court failed to consider these requirements
when determining the number of areas left available by the 1981
Ordinance.32 1 The defendants, therefore, argued that the combined
effect of the two ordinances unreasonably limits the number of areas available for their businesses. The court rejected the defendants' contention, however, and held that the remaining portions of
the 1977 Ordinance no longer applied under the 1981 Ordinance. 322 Therefore, it does not further limit the areas available to
the defendants. 23
The court reasoned that even though the spacing requirements
of the 1977 Ordinance had not been expressly invalidated, the requirements are not applicable under the 1981 Ordinance. 324 The
court stated that, generally, the remainder of an invalidated statute
cannot stand if: (1) the remainder cannot be enforced independently from the invalidated provisions; and (2) the legislative history of the statute shows that the General Assembly would not
have enacted the remainder but for the enactment of the invalidated portion of the statute.325 In this case, the court found that
the spacing requirements could not be enforced independently of
319. Renaissance Arcade, 122 Ill. 2d at 142-43, 522 N.E.2d at 81.
320. Id. at 145-46, 522 N.E.2d at 85. In County of Cook v. World Wide News
Agency, 98 Ill. App. 3d 1094, 424 N.E.2d 1173 (1st Dist. 1981), the court invalidated the
zoning scheme created by the 1977 Ordinance as an unconstitutional restraint upon the
first amendment right of free speech. Although the court invalidated most of the 1977
Ordinance, the spacing requirements were never invalidated. These spacing requirements
prohibited more than two adult use businesses from locating within 1000 feet of each
other and prohibited any adult use store from locating within 1000 feet of either a residentially-zoned area or a church. COOK COUNTY ZONING ORDINANCE § 13.16-1 (1977).
321. Renaissance Arcade, 122 Ill. 2d at 146, 522 N.E.2d at 83.
322. Id. at 149, 522 N.E.2d at 84.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 147, 522 N.E.2d at 83.
325. Id. See also George D. Hardin, Inc. v. Village of Mount Prospect, 99 Ill. 2d 96,
457 N.E.2d 429 (1983) (applying the general rule regarding the enforcement of the remainder of an invalidated statute).
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the invalidated portions of the ordinance.326 Additionally, the legislative intent of the 1977 Ordinance indicated that the spacing requirements would not have been passed but for the enactment of
the entire ordinance.3 27 In light of these facts, the court concluded
that upon invalidation of the majority of the 1977 Ordinance, the
spacing requirements of that ordinance were likewise invalidated.32 Consequently, the court held that the 1977 Ordinance's
spacing requirements did not further restrict the 1981 Ordinance's
spacing requirements.329
The defendants' final contention attacked the 1981 Ordinance's
requirement that the owners of adult use stores obtain a special use
permit prior to locating within a commercially-zoned area. 330 The
defendants objected to this requirement because the ordinance
failed to establish objective criteria by which the county board of
commissioners could determine whether the owner of an adult use
business should receive a special use permit. The court agreed
with the defendant's contention, holding that the ordinance was
unconstitutionally vague with respect to the special use permit requirement. 33' The court stated that the ordinance's failure to specify objective standards for the permits allowed county officials to
discriminate against the adult use businesses through selective and
arbitrary enforcement of the permit provision. The court, therefore, invalidated this portion of the 1981 Ordinance.332
In sum, the court upheld the 1981 Ordinance as constitutional
with respect to its limitation upon the areas available for use by the
defendants, the amortization period provided for relocation, and
the spacing requirements limiting further the possible location of
326. RenaissanceArcade, 122 Ill. 2d at 147-48, 522 N.E.2d at 83-84.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 149-150, 522 N.E.2d at 84-85. The court also noted that the county enacted the 1981 Ordinance as a comprehensive restructuring of the regulatory zoning
scheme within Cook County. The court reasoned that the 1981 Ordinance replaced entirely the prior ordinance and therefore, any remaining portions of the prior ordinance
were preempted upon enactment of the 1981 Ordinance. Id. at 147-48, 522 N.E.2d at 8384.
330. Id. at 150, 522 N.E.2d at 85.
331. Id. at 151, 522 N.E.2d at 85.
332. Id. at 152, 522 N.E.2d at 85-86. The court held that this portion of the ordinance was severable from the other portions of the 1981 Ordinance because the permit
requirement was capable of independent enforcement, and nothing in the legislative history of the ordinance indicated that the General Assembly would not have passed the
ordinance but for the inclusion of the permit requirements. Id. at 151-52, 522 N.E.2d at
85-86. Thus, the court concluded that the invalidity of the permit requirement did not
warrant invalidating the entire ordinance. Id.
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the defendants' businesses.333 In upholding the ordinance, the
court adopted the standards for regulation of adult use stores as
promulgated by the Supreme Court in Renton. 334 The court declined to adopt the more stringent application of the Renton requirements advocated by the appellate court and, instead, adopted
a somewhat relaxed Renton standard. 335 Thus, the court concluded that the 1981 Ordinance does not unreasonably impair the
defendants' right to disseminate materials protected by the first
amendment or unduly restrict public access to such materials.336
In Pre-School Owners Association v. DCFS,3 3 7 the court rejected a
Bill of Rights challenge to the Child Care Act. 338 The plaintiffs
contended that section 2.09(i) of the Child Care Act expresses a
religious preference in exempting day-care programs operated by a
religious institution from regulation. 339 This preferential treatment, the plaintiffs contended, violates the establishment clause of
the United States Constitution 3 ° and the comparable provision of
the Illinois Constitution.34 ' Applying the Lemon test,34 2 the court
concluded that the statute does not express a religious preference
333. Id. at 123, 522 N.E.2d at 73.
334. Id. at 135, 522 N.E.2d at 78.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 153, 522 N.E.2d at 83.
337. 119 Ill. 2d 268, 518 N.E.2d 1018 (1988).
338. Id. at 278, 518 N.E.2d at 1023 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, paras. 2211-2230
(1985)). The main issue in Pre-School Owners was whether the Child Care Act violates
the equal protection clause in exempting certain categories of day-care centers from regulation under the Child Care Act. See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
The defendants also contended that the Child Care Act is unconstitutionally vague
with respect to the licensing standards required under the Act. Pre-School Owners, 119
Ill. 2d at 281-82, 518 N.E.2d at 1025. The court rejected the defendant's contentions and
held that the Child Care Act is sufficiently specific to enable members of the Department
of Children and Family Services to review day-care facilities. Id. at 286, 518 N.E.2d at
1027.
339. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2212.09 (1987). Section 2.09(i) provides an exemption from the definition of day-care centers for:
(i) programs ... which (1) [serve] children who shall have attained the age of
three years, (2) [are] operated by churches or religious institutions ... (4) [are]
operated as a component of a religious nonprofit elementary school, and (5)
operate primarily to provide religious education ....
Id.
340. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
341. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 3.
342. The Lemon test, developed in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), defines
three requirements to test the validity of a statute allegedly expressing a religious preference. First, the statute must have a secular purpose. Id. at 612-13. Second, the primary
effect of the legislation must not affect religion. Third, the statute must not foster governmental entanglement in religion. Id.
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because subsection (i) has a valid legislative purpose,3 4 3 it neither
advances nor inhibits religious freedom, and it holds governmental
entanglement in religion to a minimum. 344 The court, therefore,
held the statute constitutional.345
E. Contract Clause
Under article I, section 10, of the United States Constitution, a
state cannot enact any law that may impair a pre-existing contractual obligation. 346 Historically, however, the contract clause infrequently formed the basis for a court to invalidate a particular
legislative act. 347 Notwithstanding the general trend among the
courts to avoid the use of the contract clause,34 8 the Illinois
Supreme Court adopted the rationale of the contract clause to resolve challenges to the constitutionality of two Illinois statutes during the Survey year.
In Stelzer v. Mathews Roofing Co.,
the court considered
350
whether section 13-214 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure
governs the time for bringing an action for a breach of a written
guarantee or whether the length of the written guarantee determined the appropriate statute of limitations. 35 ' The circuit court
34 9

343. Pre-School Owners, 119 Il. 2d at 280, 518 N.E.2d at 1024. The court found that
subsection (i) exempts day-care programs affiliated with a religious organization because
these programs are already subject to regulation by the State Board of Education. Additional regulation under the Child Care Act was, therefore, unnecessary. Id.
344. Id. at 280-81, 518 N.E.2d at 1024-25. The court concluded that the narrow
limits and specificity of subsection (i) minimize the provision's effect upon the practice of
religion and limit governmental intrusion into religious matters. Id. at 280, 518 N.E.2d
at 1024.
345. Id. at 281, 518 N.E.2d at 1025.
346. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1. The contract clause states in pertinent part: "No
State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts .
Id.
347. Gunther, supra note 3, at 487-500.
348. Gunther, supra note 3, at 487.
349. 117 Ill. 2d 186, 511 N.E.2d 421 (1987).
350. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-214(a) (1987). The statute states that any
action for breach of contract arising in connection with, inter alia, the construction of an
improvement to real property "shall be commenced within two years from the time the
person bringing an action ... knew or should reasonably have known of [the breach]."
Id.
351. Stelzer, 117 Ill. 2d at 188, 511 N.E.2d at 421-22. The plaintiffs in Stelzer sued to
recover the costs of repair to the roof of their house after the defendant, who installed the
roof, refused to honor his written guarantee. Id. at 185, 511 N.E.2d at 422. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the two-year statute of limitations
had expired and that the plaintiffs' suit was untimely. The plaintiffs contended that the
duration of the written guarantee should determine the proper statute of limitation. The
plaintiffs, therefore, asserted that their action was timely because the defendant's ten-year
written guarantee still had several years to run. Id. at 187, 511 N.E.2d at 421.
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enforced the two-year statute of limitation under section 13-214
and dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint as untimely.35 2 The appellate court reversed, holding that the plaintiff was entitled to bring
the action within the time period of the written guarantee.353 The
defendant appealed to the supreme court, and the court affirmed
the appellate court's decision. 3 4
The supreme court found that according to section 13-214, actions for breach of a written guarantee of over twelve years in duration can be brought at any time within the period specified by the
guarantee. 355 The court noted, however, that section 13-214 does
not define the appropriate statute of limitations for actions based
upon written guarantees for a duration of less than twelve years.356
In light of this ambiguity, the court reasoned that section 13-214
must be construed so as to allow a cause of action for breach of a
written guarantee of less than twelve years to be brought within the
time period of the written guarantee. 3 " Any other interpretation
of section 13-214, the court stated, impairs the plaintiff's pre-ex358
isting rights under the express terms of the written guarantee.
The court, therefore, concluded that the statute of limitations for
actions for breach of a written guarantee equals the time limit specified on the written guarantee.35 9
Justice Simon concurred in the judgment of the majority, but
disagreed with respect to the majority's interpretation of section
13-214. 3 1 Simon interpreted section 13-214(d) to exempt actions
352. Id.
353. Id. at 191, 511 N.E.2d at 424.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 190, 511 N.E.2d at 422-23. The court based this conclusion upon subsections (b) and (d) of section 13-214. Id. at 190, 511 N.E.2d at 422. Subsection (b) prohibits
any action for breach of warranty from being brought after 12 years from the time of the
event underlying the action. Subsection (d) modifies subsection (b), however, and states
that subsection (b) "shall not prohibit any action against a defendant who has expressly
warranted or promised the improvement to real property for a longer period from being
brought within that period." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-214 (1983). Given the
language of section (d), the court concluded that an action for breach of a written guarantee of over 12 years duration could be brought at any time during the period covered by
the guarantee. Stelzer, 117 Ill. 2d at 190, 511 N.E.2d at 422-23.
356. Stelzer, 117 Ill. 2d at 190, 511 N.E.2d at 423.
357. Id.
358. Id. According to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 242-44 (1978), a contractual right cannot be
substantially impaired by legislation unless an important public interest justifies the impairment. The defendant in Stelzer presented no evidence to indicate that a compelling
state interest justified the abrogation of the plaintiffs' contractual rights under the written
guarantee. Stelzer, 117 Ill. 2d at 191, 511 N.E.2d at 423.
359. Stelzer, 117 Ill. 2d at 191, 511 N.E.2d at 423.
360. Id. at 191-92, 511 N.E.2d at 423-24 (Simon, J., specially concurring).
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for breach of written guarantees of over twelve years in duration
36
from only the period of repose proscribed in section 13-214(b). 1
In Simon's view, section 13-214(b) does not exempt actions on
written guarantees of twelve years or more from the two-year statute of limitations. 362 Although Simon agreed with the majority's
denial of the defendant's motion for summary judgment based
upon the expiration of the statute of limitations, he would have
remanded the case for purposes of determining the date on which
the two-year statute of limitations began to run.363
A contract clause rationale also influenced the court's decision
in Buddell v. Board of Trustees, State University Retirement System. 36 The plaintiff in Buddell worked for Southern Illinois University ("SIU") in 1969 and participated in the State University
Retirement System.365 Prior to his employment for SIU, the plaintiff served in the armed forces for approximately one and threefourths years.366 The Pension Code of 1969 permitted the plaintiff
to purchase service credit for time spent in the military.367 A 1974
amendment to the Pension Code, however, limited purchases of
military service credit to persons who had participated in the pension plan prior to September 1, 1974, and who had applied for service credit by that date.3 68 The plaintiff sought to purchase his
service credit in 1983. Given the 1974 amendment to the Pension
Code, however, the Board of Trustees ("the Board") denied Buddell's claim for service credit.369 Upon administrative review, the
circuit court reversed the Board's decision and held section 15113(i) unconstitutional as violative of article XIII, section 5, of the
Illinois Constitution.37 °
361. Id. at 192, 511 N.E.2d at 423-24 (Simon, J., specially concurring).
362. Id. (Simon, J., specially concurring). Justice Simon also stated that contrary to
the majority's assertion, nothing in the history of the statute or the language of the statute
indicated a legislative intent not to impair pre-existing contractual rights of persons holding extended warranties. Id. at 192, 511 N.E.2d at 424 (Simon, J., specially concurring).
363. Id. at 194, 511 N.E.2d at 424 (Simon, J., specially concurring).
364. 118 Ill. 2d 99, 514 N.E.2d 184 (1987).
365. Id. at 100, 514 N.E.2d at 185.
366. Id.
367. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108 1/2, para. 15-113(i) (1969).
368. Buddell, 118 Ill. 2d at 101-02, 514 N.E.2d at 185. Section 15-113(i) as amended
states: "This paragraph shall not apply to individuals who become participants in the
system after September 1, 1974. Credit for military service under this paragraph shall be
allowed only to those who are eligible for credit under this paragraph and have applied
for such credit before September 1, 1974." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108 1/2, para. 15-113(i)
(1975).
369. Buddell, 118 Ill.2d at 101, 514 N.E.2d at 185.
370. Id. Article XIII, section 5 states: "Pension and Retirement Rights - Membership in any pension or retirement system of the State, any unit of local government or
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On appeal, the Board contended that the plaintiff was not entitled to receive the additional benefits based upon his prior military
service because he had not claimed those rights as required under
the statute and had given no consideration for the additional benefits.371 The Board, therefore, argued that no contractual relationship existed between the parties.3 1 2 The court rejected the Board's
contention, however, and found that under the Illinois Constitution, all pension plans previously defined as non-contractual plans
became contractual pension plans.3 73 Accordingly, the court held
that upon adoption of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, all of the
plaintiff's rights under the Pension Code of 1969 became contractual in nature3 74 and could not be altered or released except in
exchange for valid consideration.3 75 Consequently, the court concluded that because the legislature had not offered the plaintiff any
consideration in exchange for the relinquishment of his right to
purchase military service credit, the plaintiff still retains this
right.3 76 The court, therefore, held that insofar as section 15-113(i)
attempted to divest the plaintiff of his contractual rights under the
Pension Code of 1969 without valid consideration, section
15-113(i) violated article XIII, section 5, of the Illinois
Constitution.377
Although the court in both Buddell and Stelzer recognized and
protected the plaintiffs' contractual rights, the court did not base
its decision upon the contract clause per se. Instead, the court examined the language of the challenged statute and adopted a construction of these statutes that protected the plaintiffs' contractual
rights. The court's reluctance to invoke the contract clause remained consistent with the general tendency of the judiciary to
school district or any agency or instrumentality thereof shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired." ILL. CONST.
art. XIII, § 5.
371. Buddell, 118 Ill. 2d at 105, 514 N.E.2d at 187.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 104-05, 514 N.E.2d at 187. The pre-1970 Illinois Constitution distinguished between contractual and noncontractual pension plans. In drafting the 1970 constitution, the delegates intended to preserve "the vested rights of pension plan
participants." Id. at 102, 514 N.E.2d at 186. In furtherance of this objective, the court
held that the Illinois Constitution of 1970 eliminated the distinction between contractual
and noncontractual plans, thereby vesting contractual rights in all pension plan participants. Id.
374. Id. at 104-05, 514 N.E.2d at 187.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id.
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avoid use of the contract clause.378
F.

Commerce Clause

In Goldberg v. Johnson,379 the court addressed the issue of
whether section 4 of the Telecommunications Excise Tax Act
("TETA"), 38 0 which imposes a tax on telecommunications
originating or received in Illinois, violates the commerce clause of
the United States Constitution. 38 The plaintiffs in Goldberg initially filed a class action complaint against the Illinois Department
of Revenue ("the Department") and various long-distance telephone carriers operating in Illinois, seeking an injunction to prohibit the collection of the TETA tax.382 In response to the
plaintiffs' complaint, the Director of the Department of Revenue
("the Director") filed a motion for summary judgment on the
grounds that section 4 of TETA was constitutional.383 The court
denied the Director's motion and held that section 4 of TETA violated the commerce clause and the equal protection clause because
it "[discriminated] against interstate commerce and it [was] not
fairly related to services provided in Illinois. ' ' 3 4 The court granted
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and
entered an order al385
lowing the Director to appeal immediately.
378. Gunther, supra note 3, at 498. See Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power
and Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983) (according greater deference to legislative judgment
and declining to conduct a stricter scrutiny of a state law impairing pre-existing contracts). But see Note, Rediscovering the Contract Clause, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1414 (1984).
379. 117 Ill. 2d 493, 512 N.E.2d 1262 (1987). The United States Supreme Court
recently affirmed the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Goldberg v. Sweet, 109 S.Ct.
582 (1989).
380. Telecommunication Excise Tax Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 2004
(1987), states in pertinent part:
A tax is imposed upon the act or privilege of originating in this State or receiving in this State interstate telecommunications by a person in this State at a rate
of five percent of the gross charge for such telecommunications ....To prevent
actual multistate taxation of the [telecommunications], any taxpayer ... shall
be allowed a credit against the tax imposed [by this section] ....
Id.
381. Goldberg, 117 Ill. 2d at 497, 512 N.E.2d at 1264 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
382. Id. at 495, 512 N.E.2d at 1263.
383. Id. at 496, 512 N.E.2d at 1264.
384. Id. at 497, 512 N.E.2d at 1264.
385. Id. at 504, 512 N.E.2d at 1264. Prior to its resolution of the commerce clause
challenge, the court addressed the Director's contention that section 4 of TETA did not
involve interstate commerce and, therefore, could not be in violation of the commerce
clause. Id. at 498, 512 N.E.2d at 1265. The court rejected the Director's contention,
holding that the taxable event under the statute was "[t]he act or privilege of originating
or receiving interstate telecommunications ... in this State" and that this taxable event
was inextricably bound to the interstate activity of interstate communication. Id. at 499-
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The court examined section 4 of TETA in light of the Complete
Auto test.3" 6 The court first determined that a substantial nexus
exists between the State of Illinois and telecommunications
originated or received in Illinois a"7 because the taxable event occurs in Illinois and the tax is both billed and paid in Illinois. Given
these facts, the court concluded that a substantial nexus exists between the taxable event and the State of Illinois.3 8
The court next determined that the tax imposed under section 4
of TETA is not fairly apportioned. 38 9 Although the court recognized that an unapportioned tax poses the threat of multiple taxing, it concluded that an unapportioned tax is not per se
unconstitutional. 39° Thus, despite the fact that the tax is unapportioned, the court did not invalidate the tax.39'
The court continued its commerce clause analysis and determined that in taxing the origination and reception of telecommunications in Illinois, TETA does not discriminate against interstate
commerce. 392 The court reasoned that TETA poses no threat of
multiple taxing with respect to the origination of telecommunications because only Illinois can levy a tax upon telecommunications
originating in Illinois.393 While multiple taxation does threaten the
reception of telecommunications in Illinois,3 94 the statute provides
credit for taxpayers subjected to two or more taxes on the same
500, 512 N.E.2d at 1265. Thus, "[t]he act or privilege of originating or receiving interstate telecommunications" fell within the purview of the commerce clause. Id. at 499500, 512 N.E.2d at 1265-66.
386. Id. at 500, 512 N.E.2d at 1266 (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430
U.S. 274, 287 (1977)). The Court applied a four-part test in Complete Auto to determine
whether a particular statute violated the commerce clause of the federal constitution.
Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 287. First, the court must determine whether a substantial
nexus exists between the activity taxed and the taxing state. Id. Second, the tax must be
fairly apportioned so as to be limited to the portion of the activity which occurs within
the state. Third, the tax must not discriminate against interstate commerce. Id. Finally,
the tax must be fairly related to services provided by the state. Id.
387. Goldberg, 117 Ill.2d at 500-01, 512 N.E.2d at 1266.
388. Id. at 501, 512 N.E.2d at 1266.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 501-02, 512 N.E.2d at 1266.
392. Id. at 502-03, 512 N.E.2d at 1267. Discrimination against interstate commerce
would occur if the tax imposed multiple taxing upon the taxpayer. Id. at 502, 512 N.E.2d
at 1266.
393. Id. at 502, 512 N.E.2d at 1266-67.
394. Id. at 502, 512 N.E.2d at 1267. The telecommunications received in Illinois
may be subjected to a tax in the state wherein the telecommunication originated in addition to the Illinois tax. Thus, the taxpayer would be taxed twice on the same communication. Id. at 503, 512 N.E.2d at 1267.
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telecommunication.395 Thus, no real danger of multiple taxing exists. The court, therefore, held that TETA does not discriminate
against interstate commerce.396
Finally, the court determined that the tax on telecommunications is sufficiently related to benefits extended to the taxpayer by
Illinois.397 The court noted that the State facilitates the origination
of telecommunication in Illinois and provides other services to the
telecommunication carriers.3 9s These services are sufficiently connected with the origination or reception of telecommunications in
Illinois to justify the imposition of a tax upon those
telecommunications. 399
Thus, the court found that section 4 of TETA meets the necessary elements of the Complete Auto test, and therefore does not
,violate the commerce clause." Accordingly, the court upheld section 4 of TETA as constitutional. 4 01
G.

Interpretation of the ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION

In League of Women Voters v. County of Peoria,"2 the supreme
court offered a definitive interpretation of article VII of the Illinois
Constitution which provides for the creation and establishment of
local county boards." °a The Peoria League of Women Voters ("the
League") sponsored a referendum in 1986 to change the representative districts in Peoria County from multiple-member districts to
single-member districts. 404 The referendum was successful and the
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id. at 504, 512 N.E.2d at 1267.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 503, 512 N.E.2d at 1267. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' equal
protection challenge, holding that telecommunications originating or received in Illinois
have a greater connection to the state than other forms of telecommunications and that
this greater connection provides a rational basis for differentiation between these and
other forms of telecommunications. Id. at 506, 512 N.E.2d at 1268. Because a rational
basis exists for the legislature's differentiation between intrastate and interstate communications, the court held that section 4 of TETA does not violate the equal protection
clause. Id.
401. Id. at 506, 512 N.E.2d at 1269.
402. 121 Ill. 2d 236, 520 N.E.2d 626 (1987).
403. Id. at 244-55, 520 N.E.2d at 630-35 (citing ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. VII).
404. Id. at 241, 520 N.E.2d at 628. Peoria County was divided into nine districts.
Under the Code of Peoria County, each district was to elect three representatives to serve
as members of the Peoria County Board. Id. at 240, 520 N.E.2d at 628. The plaintiffs'
referendum sought to decrease the number of each district's representatives from three to
one, thereby converting Peoria County from multiple-member districts to single-member
districts. Id. at 241, 520 N.E.2d at 628.
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League then attempted to implement the changes authorized by
the referendum." °5 The County of Peoria, however, refused to enforce the referendum." 6 The League filed suit in circuit court seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the defendants to implement the
changes under the referendum. 4" The circuit court dismissed the
plaintiffs complaint with prejudice." ° The supreme court permitted direct appeal to resolve the question of whether the electorate
could change the number of members on the Peoria County Board
by referendum.' 9
To resolve this question, the court examined sections 3(a), 3(b),
4(c), and 7(2) of the Illinois Constitution.4 10 The court first noted
that according to section 3(a), the number of county board mem-bers is determined by ordinance "with limitations provided by
law."'4 1' The court held that the meaning of the term "law" as

used in section 3(a) excludes a referendum like the one here involved because the Illinois Constitution does not expressly authorize such a referendum for use in changing the number of county
board members.4 12 The court stated that unless section 3(a) expressly authorized the use of a referendum as a means of changing
the number of county board members, the referendum could not be
enforced. 41 3 Because the court found no express authorization for

the use of a referendum within section 3(a), the court held that the
referendum could not be enforced.41 4
The court further noted that sections 3(b), 4(c), and 7(2) expressly authorize the use of referenda to change the method of selection of board members, the manner of selection of county
officers, and the form of government. 41 5 Given the express provision for the use of referenda in sections 3(b), 4(c), and 7(2) to effect
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 242, 520 N.E.2d at 629.
408. Id. at 239, 520 N.E.2d at 628.
409. Id. at 239-40, 520 N.E.2d at 628. The majority recognized that a referendum
could be used to change the districts from multiple-member to single-member districts;
but the majority denied that this meant that a referendum could also be used to change
the number of county board members. Id. at 245, 520 N.E.2d at 630.
410. Id. at 244, 520 N.E.2d at 630. ILL. CONST. art. VII, §§ 3(a), 3(b), 4(c), and 7(2).
411. League of Women Voters, 121 Ill. 2d at 244, 520 N.E.2d at 630. Section 3(a)
states: "(a) A county board shall be elected in each county. The number of members of
the county board shall be fixed by ordinance in each county within limitations provided
by law." ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 3(a).
412. League of Women Voters, 121 Ill. 2d at 245, 520 N.E.2d at 630.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 254, 520 N.E.2d at 634. Section 3(b) provides in pertinent part: "No
county, other than Cook County, may change its method of electing board members
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certain governmental changes, the court reasoned that had the legislature intended to allow the number of county board members to
be changed by referenda, it would have done so expressly in section
3(a).416 Because neither section 3(a) nor any other provision of the
Illinois Constitution of 1970 expressly authorized the use of a
referendum to change the number of county board members, the
court held 4 1the
Peoria County referendum void and
7
unenforceable.
Justice Simon argued in dissent that the majority erred in finding
that a referendum does not constitute a "law" for purposes of section 3(a).41 8 Simon also argued that the power to change by referendum from multiple-member districts to single-member districts
necessarily implied the power to change the number of members
on the county board. 41 9 Thus, the power to do the latter should be
implied in the grant of the power to effect the former and the referendum as duly passed by the Peoria electorate should have been
enforced.42°
In reaching its decision, the majority in League of Women Voters
adopted a narrow construction of article VII of the Illinois Constitution. The majority refused to recognize the use of a referendum
to change the number of county board members because the constitution did not expressly authorize the use of a referendum for
such a purpose. The majority's conclusion in this case appears to
impose a tighter rein upon the powers of the electorate, and limits
such powers to those specifically enumerated in the constitution.
except as approved by county-wide referendum." ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 3(b) (emphasis
added).
Section 4(c) provides in pertinent part: "Any office may be created or eliminated and
the terms of office and manner of selection changed by county-wide referendum." ILL.
CONST. art. VII, § 4(c) (emphasis added).
Section 7(2) states in pertinent part: "Counties and municipalities which are not home
rule units shall have only powers granted to them by law and the powers . . .(2) by
referendum, to adopt, alter or repeal their form of government provided by law." ILL.
CONST. art. VII, § 7(2) (emphasis added).
416. League of Women Voters, 121 Ill. 2d at 254, 520 N.E.2d at 634.
417. Id. at 255, 520 N.E.2d at 635.
418. Id. (Simon, J., dissenting). Justice Simon cited abundant authority for the proposition that a successfully passed referendum has the effect of law. Id. at 255-56, 520
N.E.2d at 635. See., e.g., Ohio ex rel Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 568 (1916) (a
properly approved referendum is law). Nevertheless, Justice Simon noted that no Illinois
court had approved a referendum as law. League of Women Voters, 121 Ill. 2d at 255,
520 N.E.2d at 635 (Simon, J., dissenting).
419. League of Women Voters, 121 Ill. 2d at 257, 520 N.E.2d at 636 (Simon, J.,
dissenting).
420. Id. at 25 8-59, 520 N.E.2d at 637 (Simon, J., dissenting). Justice Clark joined in
this dissent. Id. at 259, 520 N.E.2d at 637 (Simon, J., dissenting).
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This interpretation contrasts with the court's ready presumption of
a particular legislative or judicial power unless a specific provision
indicates to the contrary.

III.

CONCLUSION

During the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court resolved numerous challenges to the constitutionality of various Illinois statutes. The court assessed the challenged statutes in terms of equal
protection, due process, and separation of powers. In addition, the
court addressed several challenges based upon the Bill of Rights,
the contract clause, and the commerce clause. The court also offered a definitive interpretation of the Illinois Constitution with respect to the establishment of county governments. In most of the
cases during the Survey year, the court rejected the presented challenge and upheld the contested statute as constitutional.

